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THE EFFICIENT NORM FOR CORPORATE 
LAW: A NEOTRADITIONAL 
INTERPRETATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Thomas A. Smith* 
To economically oriented corporate law professors, distinguishing 
between directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders and a duty to the 
corporation1 itself smacks of reification2 - treating the fictional cor­
porate entity as if it were a real thing. Now the orthodox view among 
corporate law scholars is that the corporate fiduciary duty is a norm 
that requires firm managers to "maximize shareholder value."3 Giving 
the corporation itself any serious role in the analysis of fiduciary duty, 
the thinking goes, obscures scientific insight with bad legal metaphys­
ics. 
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1981, University of Oxford; J.D. 1984, Yale. - Ed. I would like to thank Larry Alexander, 
Stuart Benjamin, Lynne Dallas, Hugh Friedman, Robert W. Hillman, Paul Horton, Mike 
Kelly, Frank Partnoy, Mike Rappaport, Dan Rodriguez, Emily Sherwin, Chris Wonnell, and 
Fred Zacharias for helpful comments, some of which were made at the University of San 
Diego Law School Research Colloquium. Particular thanks to Suzanne Skolnick, my re­
search assistant, for her excellent work. This Article is dedicated to the memory of Carol 
Marie Gromer. 
1. "[A] distinction, " Lawrence Mitchell notes, "that has been slighted in the law." 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 579, 586 {1992); see also Donald E. Schwartz, 
Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALi's Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 511, 512 {1984). 
2. The Oxford English Dictionary defines reification as "the mental conversion of a per­
son or abstract concept into a thing." 13 THE COMP ACT EDITION OF TIIE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 532 {2d ed. 1989). 
3. See, e.g., ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY {1932); MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FuNDAMENTALS 
OF CORPORATION LAW 97 {1995) {Corporate law scholars "generally agree[ ] that 
management's principal fiduciary duty is to maximize the return to the common 
shareholders . ... "); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Nonn: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1423 (1993); A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1049 (1931); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the 
Expense of Shareholder Gain - A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 
13 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 7, 8 {1988) ("[M]aximization of shareholder value is the polestar of 
managerial decisionmaking. "); A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve?: 
The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991). For a 
good summary of the shareholder primacy norm in legal scholarship, see D. Gordon Smith, 
The Shareholder Primacy Nonn, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277-83 {1998). 
214 
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Some recent scholarship4 and legislation, such as constituency stat­
utes,5 have challenged this "shareholder primacy"6 view. Contestants 
on both sides of the debate over corporate fiduciary duty assume, 
however, that economic analysis inevitably favors shareholder pri­
macy.7 Critics of shareholder value maximization encourage this as­
sumption by making their case turn, in part, on criticisms of economic 
methodology itself8 and on invocations of moral and political values 
4. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence G. Mitchell ed., 1995); 
Margaret M. Blair, Stakeholders as Shareholders, Ownership and Control: Rethinking 
Corporate GovernarJce for the Twenty-First Century, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1150 (1996); 
William W. Bratton, Jr., Public Values and Corporate Fiduciary Law, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 
675 (1992); Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed 
Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. 
PROBS. 587 (1997); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993); David Millon, Redefining Corporate 
Law, 24 lND. L. REV. 223 (1991) [hereinafter Millon, Redefining Corporate Law]; Lawrence 
E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 V AND. L. REV. 1263 (1992) 
[hereinafter Mitchell, A Critical Look]; Mitchell, supra note 1. 
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0830(3) (1997); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-2-202(b)(5) (1994); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (1993 Replacement); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 716 (West 1981); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, 65 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. 302A.251 (West 1985); MISS. 
CODE ANN. 79-4-8.30(d) (Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:6-1(2) (West 1969); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. 53-ll-35(D) (Michie Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1701.59(E) (Baldwin 1995); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 180.0827 (West 1995). Some apply only when an acquisition proposal is 
under review. See Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702(1996); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602, -1702 
(1995); IOWA CODE ANN. 491.lOlB (West 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92 G (West 
1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (1994). Some place other constituencies in putative equal­
ity with shareholders. See IND. CODE ANN. 23-1-35-l(f) (West Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE 
ANN.§ 491.lOlB (West 1991); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 515 (1995). 
For scholarly reaction to constituency statutes, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting 
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 971 (1992); William J. Camey, Does 
Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1990); Eric W. Orts, Beyond 
Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 
(1992); Patrick J. Ryan, Calculating the "Stakes" for Corporate Stakeholders as Part of Busi­
ness Decision-Making, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 555 (1992); Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper 
Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 
STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991). 
6. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919); Lyman Johnson, The 
Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEXAS L. 
REV. 865 (1990); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm 
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313 (1992); Smith, supra 
note 3, at 277. For other statements of duty to shareholders in case law, see Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986); Polk v. Good, 507 
A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (N.J. 
1981). 
7. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 68; Jonathan R. Macey, An Eco­
nomic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiar­
ies of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 26-29 (1991). For an unsympa­
thetic account of the link between shareholder primacy and economic analysis, see Johnson, 
supra note 6, at 884-86. Both proponents and critics, however, believe that shareholder pri­
macy is grounded in an economic view. 
8.�Lyman Johnson, for example, inveighs as follows: 
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most economists would find controversial at best.9 
Nevertheless, the economic approach to corporate law does not 
foreordain the maximization of shareholder value as the primary norm 
of corporate law. The economic case for shareholder value maximiza­
tion is, in fact, initially puzzling and ultimately unconvincing. If eco­
nomic efficiency is the normative guidepost for substantive law, the 
principal norm of corporate law cannot be the maximization of share­
holder value. 
It is easy to see why this must be so. The corporate fiduciary duty, 
according to the leading economic analysis of corporate law, is a prin­
ciple that fills gaps in the "corporate contract."10 The "corporate con­
tract" is the metaphorical contract consisting of the sum of the volun­
tary arrangements among the various parties who contribute resources 
to the corporate enterprise and have claims against it.11 Discovering 
(W]hile the notions of accountability and efficiency serve as [the economic] model's appar­
ent lifelines to more widely shared social norms, the dreary egoistic underpinnings make it 
clear that those notions are only enticing window dressing; they are not essential. The con­
tractual model subscribes to the root norm that, in a pinch, people do - therefore they 
should - act to save their own skin. If that is one's sense of life, why should the ethos in 
work and business or corporate law be different? • . .  [It] reminds one of B.F. Skinner's work 
with pigeons. 
Johnson, supra note 6, at 895-96 (citations omitted). 
9. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE 
CORPORATE LAW 35, 39-49 (Lawrence G. Mitchell, ed., 1995); David Millon, Comm unitari­
anism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE 
CORPORATE LAW 1, 4-10 (Lawrence G. Mitchell, ed., 1995); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Com­
munity and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law 
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997); Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the 
Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 391 (1997); Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sov­
ereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215 (1992); Johnson, supra note 6; 
David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment 
at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975 (1998); Millon, Redefining Corporate 
Law, supra note 4; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990); 
Marleen A. O'Connor, Symposium, Corporate Malaise - Stakeholder Statllles: Cause or 
Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 3 (1991); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's 
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. 
REV. 1189 (1991) (hereinafter O'Connor, Restructuring]; Orts, supra note 5; Lewis D. Solo­
mon, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Constituency Debate, 59 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 321 (1990). 
10. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 90-93. 
11. The contractual approach to the firm was developed by economists, see Armen A. 
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 
AM. ECON. REV. 777, 794 (1972); Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 
390-92 (1937); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 307-08 (1976); 
William A. Klein, The Modem Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 
YALEL.J.1521, 1521 (1982); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J.1197, 
1200 (1984); and applied by lawyers, see, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Contractual Freedom in 
Corporate Law - Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Contractual Freedom]; Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints 011 
Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1840-46 (1989) [hereinafter Bebchuk, 
Limiting Contractual Freedom]; Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover 
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the correct gap-filling principles for the corporate contract involves 
hypothetical bargain analysis - asking what contractual terms ra­
tional parties would have agreed to had they addressed ex ante the 
matter that falls into a contractual gap.12 For corporate contracts, the 
prevailing view is that this gap-filling principle should be "maximize 
shareholder value." According to this view, that is the substance of 
the corporate fiduciary duty. 
One can adopt the contractual approach to corporate law and 
agree that the fiduciary duty is essentially a principle for filling gaps in 
corporate contracts. Nevertheless, the next step in the argument for 
the prevailing view, that the substance of this gap-filling principle 
should be shareholder value maximization, does not follow. Rational 
corporate investors in a hypothetical bargain setting would not agree 
to shareholder value maximization as their gap-filling rule. The main 
point of this Article is to explain why they would not and to explain 
what they would choose instead. 
Rational corporate investors would not choose shareholder wealth 
maximization as their gap-filling rule because of what investor ration­
ality entails. In economic analysis of corporate law, it is standard to 
treat shareholders as rational in the sense described in basic finance 
theory, in particular, the Capital Assets Pricing Model ("CAPM"). 
Investors who are rational in the CAPM sense would hypothetically 
agree to a gap-filling principle, but it would not be "maximize share­
holder value." Under CAPM, rational investors will diversify among 
all classes of capital assets, including both corporate stocks and bonds. 
In fact, they will hold the "market portfolio," that is, a portfolio that is 
a microcosm of all capital assets, in which each type of capital asset 
has the same place proportionally in the rational investor's portfolio as 
it does in the capital market as a whole. Thus it would be irrational 
for investors to agree to a principle that required the value of their 
shares to be maximized if it meant reducing the value of their bonds 
(or of any other nonresiduary class of capital assets they might hold) 
by more than the increase in the value of their stock. The shareholder 
value maximization norm allows, and under plausible assumptions 
even requires, managers to make inefficient decisions which hypo­
thetical rational investors would not permit ex ante. Rational inves­
tors would therefore not agree to it. 
To what corporate law norm would rational investors hypotheti­
cally agree? They would agree to a norm that told managers to maxi-
Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 611, 615-17 (1988). For a critical view of 
contractualism, see William \V. Bratton Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A 
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989). 
12. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 90-91; Daniel R. Fischel, The Cor­
porate Governance Movement, 35 V AND. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1982); Jonathan R. Macey, An 
Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Benefi­
ciaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (1991). 
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mize the value of the diversified portfolios that CAPM says rational 
investors would hold. As a gap-filling principle, this would require 
firm managers to make the choices that would maximize the value of 
the sum of financial claims against the corporation, because these 
claims will be held proportionally by rational CAPM investors holding 
the market portfolio.13 If a public corporation were financed half by 
stock and half by bonds, a rational investor holding the market port­
folio would have his investment in that corporation divided evenly be­
tween its stock and its bonds. He would obviously not agree to a rule 
that allowed managers to make choices that diminished the value of 
his bonds by more than they increased the value of his stock. He 
would insist on a rule that required managers to maximize the value of 
the sum of the two classes of claims against that corporation. This rule 
would be the gap filler which rational investors would agree managers 
should follow if the corporate contract did not provide otherwise. 
This would be the content of the fiduciary duty rational investors 
would accept ex ante. 
Articulating this duty has interesting consequences. A fiduciary 
duty running to the corporation itself would be most consistent with 
the gap-filling rule that emerges from hypothetical bargain analysis. 
This rule would require corporate managers (absent explicit contrac­
tual terms to the contrary) to take whatever actions maximized the 
value of "the corporation" - maximized, that is, the sum of the value 
of financial claims against the corporation - whether doing so pri­
marily benefited shareholders or some other class of corporate claim­
ants. Far from mysteriously reifying the corporation, this approach 
requires nothing more conceptually murky than addition. This 
reformulation of the duty is notably inconsistent, however, with treat­
ing one class of corporate claimants, such as common shareholders, as 
the exclusive and direct beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty, as is now 
standard in economic analysis of corporate law. It is also inconsistent, 
however, with making all or several classes of claimants against the 
corporation direct and simultaneous beneficiaries of the fiduciary 
duty, as seems to be suggested by some advocates of bondholder 
rights.14 The "neotraditional" conception of fiduciary duty I propose, 
a duty running to the corporation itself, would require actions of man-
13. A financial claim is a legal claim against a financial asset - a claim that might arise, 
for example, from ownership. A financial asset is an asset such as a stock, bond, right, cer­
tificate, etc., as distinguished from a tangible, physical asset. For example, real property is a 
physical asset, but shares in a real estate investment trust (REIT) or stock or bonds of a 
company that held property as an investment would be financial assets. See JOHN DOWNES 
& JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, FINANCE AND INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 311 (4th ed. 1995). 
Many assets, such as tort claims, are not normally considered financial assets but can be con­
verted into financial assets through a process of "securitization. " See, e.g., Thomas A. Smith, 
A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367, 419-32 (1994). 
14. For authors suggesting a fiduciary duty to bondholders, see supra note 4. 
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agers that would sometimes benefit one class of claimants and some­
times another, depending on the circumstances. Once one dispenses 
with misguided fears of reification, there is nothing particularly trou­
bling about this approach. 
There is, however, more than a mere theoretical quibble in the dif­
ference between a fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders of public 
corporations to maximize the value of their shares and a duty owed to 
the corporation to maximize its value. It is true that managers of a 
"plain vanilla" public corporation, one with a simple capital structure 
and little debt, might have incentives to maximize the sum of the value 
of all financial claims against that corporation. When corporate capi­
tal structures get more complicated in certain ways, however, the 
shareholder value maximization version of fiduciary duty will mislead 
managers. And there is every reason to expect corporate capital struc­
tures will become increasingly complex in just those ways, as Professor 
Hu, one of the leading prophets of financial complexity, has convinc­
ingly argued.15 For example, the "equity" of firms can be (and is be­
ing) sliced up into various derivative securities.16 Stock can be struc­
tured as claims on the profits of certain parts of the issuer's business 
rather than on the whole business of the corporation.17 Firms can be­
come highly leveraged18 and can issue hybrid securities.19 These inno­
vations strain traditional concepts of fiduciary duty. This problem is 
not as difficult to resolve, however, as Professor Hu seems to think. 
The neotraditional conception of fiduciary duty I propose responds, 
15. See Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, The Modern Process of Financial Inno­
vation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1273 (1991). 
16. See id. at 1277; see also Bernard J. Karol & Mary B. Lehman, Equity Derivatives, 27 
REV. OF SEC. & COMM. REG. 121 (1994); Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: 
Financial Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1319 (1991); 
Thomas A. Russo, Regulation of Equity Derivatives, 815 PU/CORP 335 (1993); Saul Hansell, 
ls the World Ready for Synthetic Equity?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1990, at 54; 
Claire Makin, Hedging Your Derivatives Doubts, INSTITUTIONAL lNvEsTOR, Dec. 1991, at 
113. 
17. See THE HANDBOOK OF EQUTIY DERIVATIVES 3-32 (Jack Clark Francis et al. eds, 
1995); Jeffrey Allen, Reinventing a Corporation: The "Satellite" Structure of Thermo Elec­
tron, 11 J. APP. CORP. FIN., Summer 1998, at 38; Jeffrey Allen & John McConnell, Equity 
Carve-outs and Managerial Discretion, 53 J. FIN. 163 (1998); Hu, supra note 15, at 1288-1300; 
Bernard J. Karol, An Overview of Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. 
& FIN. 195, 203 (1995); Dennis E. Logue et al., Rearranging Residual Claims: A Case for 
Targeted Stock, 25 J. FIN. MGMT. 43 (1996); Roni Michaely & Wayne H. Shaw, The Choice 
of Going Public: Spin-offs vs. Carve-outs, 24 J. FIN. MGMT. 5 (1995); Vikram Nanda, On the 
Good News in Equity Carve-outs, 46 J. FIN. 1717 (1991). 
18. See Allen, supra note 17. 
19. See JOHN F. MARSHALL & VIPUL K. BANSAL, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING: A 
COMPLETE GUIDE TO FINANCIAL INNOVATION 475-492 (1992); Issuers Opt For Hybrid Se­
curities, 2 INS. FIN. & INv. No. 26 (1997); Karol, supra note 17, at 203; Kerry Capell, High 
Yields, Low Cost, Funny Names, Bus. WK., Sept. 9, 1996, at 122; R.S. Salomon, Jr., Profitable 
Hybrid, FORBES, Apr. 24, 1995, at 404. 
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for all its simplicity, remarkably well to these challenges, as I explain 
below. 
This Article begins by describing in Part I the familiar conflict be­
tween the interests of shareholders and those of bondholders. I add a 
new point by stressing, however, that this problem is not limited, as is 
often supposed, to the "vicinity of insolvency,"20 to use Chancellor 
Allen's phrase.21 It will, under standard and plausible assumptions of 
modern finance theory, never be efficient for firm managers to 
"maximize shareholder value," as long as there are fixed claims such 
as bonds in the firm's capital structure. The "vicinity of insolvency," 
strictly speaking, is determined only by the riskiness of the invest­
ments available to the firm. If financial markets are complete, as 
modern finance theory usually assumes, available investments will not 
be limited by their riskiness. The capital market will offer a complete 
menu, including even extremely risky investments. Some of these 
risky opportunities will increase the expected value of stock, the resid­
ual claims on a firm, but decrease the value of nonresidual claims by 
even more, thus decreasing the expected value of the sum of financial 
claims again the firm. Thus the "vicinity of insolvency," as Chancellor 
Allen has imagined it, cannot be defined, and therefore the moment at 
which a firm enters it is indeterminate. In a simple world of firms with 
stock and debt and complete capital markets, it will be inefficient for 
managers to maximize shareholder value, because that would mean 
managers should pick very risky and inefficient bets. 
This problem motivates Part II of this Article, which attempts to 
formulate an efficient version of the corporate fiduciary duty. Eco­
nomic analysis of corporate law, as I noted above, views the corpora­
tion as a nexus of contracts, and the corporate fiduciary duty as a 
"gap-filling principle." Economic analysts typically determine gap­
filling principles by using hypothetical bargain analysis - asking what 
gap-filling principle rational parties would have agreed to ex ante. In 
Part II, I use hypothetical bargain analysis to show that rational inves­
tors would not choose shareholder value maximization as a norm, but 
rather would choose maximization of corporate value as a norm. This 
analysis, as I noted above, involves a conception of investor rationality 
derived from CAPM. 
In the remainder of the Article, I turn to some practical applica­
tions. In Part III, I look briefly at some areas of public corporation 
law that illustrate the indifference of corporate law to merely distribu­
tional transactions, a phenomenon that is easiest to explain in light of 
rational investor indifference to transactions of these kinds. In Part 
20. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 
Civ.A 12150, 1991 WL 2776 13, at * 34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
21. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of 
Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 V AND. L. REV. 1485, 1511- 12 & n.87 (1993). 
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IV, I summarize the issues Hu has raised concerning the stresses fi­
nancial innovation and the disaggregation of equity is putting on tradi­
tional conceptions of fiduciary duty in corporate law. The norm of 
maximizing corporate value - what I term the "neotraditional" ap­
proach - is, I suggest, an intuitively appealing way to relieve this 
stress. Part V is a brief conclusion. 
I. THE INEFFICIENCY OF THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
MAxlMIZATION NORM 
Corporate law scholars generally assume that efficiency arguments 
inevitably lead to the conclusion that maximizing shareholder value 
should be the primary norm of corporate law.22 This conclusion, how­
ever, is unwarranted. In fact, the shareholder value maximization 
norm, if strictly applied, would require firm managers to make socially 
inefficient choices. This analysis follows from the familiar corporate 
law problem of the firm in the "vicinity of insolvency."23 
A. Shareholder Value Maximization Mandates Inefficiency 
In this Part, I use a numerical example to show how a norm to 
maximize shareholder value mandates inefficiency and then explore 
some implications. 
1. An Inefficient Risky Investment 
Consider the choice faced by the managers of XYZ corporation. 
They must choose between only two investment opportunities. In­
vestment 1 is relatively safe; Investment 2, risky. XYZ corporation is 
solvent. It has assets worth $20 million and liabilities of $15 million, 
all of which is owed to bondholders. 
Investment 1 requires an outlay of $10 million and has a 90 percent 
probability of being worth $12 million, and a 10 percent probability of 
being worth $8 million, after one period. Thus Investment 1 has an 
expected value of $11.6 million, and net of the initial outlay of $10 
million, a value of $1.6 million. Put another way, shareholders have a 
90 percent chance of a $2 million gain, and a 10 percent chance of a $2 
million loss, for an expected gain to shareholders from Investment 1 of 
$1.6 million. 
All of the expected gain from Investment 1 would go to the share-
22. For discussions of maximizing share value as socially efficient, see EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 38; Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Cor­
porate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 203-05 
(1991); Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1329; and Milton Friedman, The Social Respon­
sibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. 
23. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 21. 
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holders because the claim of bondholders is fixed at $15 million. 
Whether Investment 1 pays off at $12 million or $8 million, XYZ will 
have enough value left in it to pay the bondholders all of the $15 mil­
lion that is owed to them. 
Investment 2, on the other hand, is much more risky. It also re­
quires an outlay of $10 million, but it has a 10 percent probability of 
paying off grandly at $200 million. But it has a 90 percent probability 
of wiping the company out by generating losses of $20 million, equal 
to all of the assets of the company. Investment 2 has an expected 
value of only $2 million, and, net of the required initial outlay of $10 
million, a value of negative $8 million. From the perspective of social 
wealth, it is obviously a bad investment - it has a negative net ex­
pected value. 
Shareholders, however, will not view it as so bad. If Investment 2 
pays off at $200 million, shareholders will get all of it. If the bet pays 
off at negative $20 million, on the other hand, shareholders will not 
lose the entire $20 million, because they enjoy limited liability. In­
stead, they will lose their equity in XYZ, which is only $5 million. 
Thus the expected value of Investment 2 to shareholders is 10 percent 
of $200 million plus 90 percent of negative $5 million, for a total ex­
pected gain to shareholders of $16.5 million. Net of the $10 million 
initial outlay, Investment 2 has an expected value to shareholders of 
$6.5 million. 
Bondholders, of course, would bear the brunt of the risk of In­
vestment 2. If Investment 2 pays off big, they will be no better off 
than before; they will still be paid only their fixed claim of $15 million. 
If Investment 2 fails, however, they will lose their investment, which 
was worth $15 million before the risky bet was made.24 With the for­
mer event having a 10 percent chance of happening, and the latter a 90 
percent chance, bondholders face an expected loss of $13.5 million 
from Investment 2. 
Faced with the choice between Investment 1 and Investment 2, 
corporate managers exclusively loyal to the shareholders should 
choose Investment 2, even though it has a net expected value of less 
than Investment 1. That is, managers loyal to shareholders will choose 
Investment 2, even though it is inefficient. In terms of normative eco­
nomic theory, this is an absurd result. There must be something 
wrong with the simple formulation of corporate fiduciary duty as a 
duty to "maximize shareholder value." 
24. I am assuming that bond covenants do not prevent the risky, inefficient bet. If bond 
covenants were complete, then no risky, inefficient bet would be unanticipated. They are 
not, however. See infra text accompanying note 53. 
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2. In the "Vicinity of Insolvency" 
Corporate law scholars will recognize that the illustration above is 
similar to those used to illustrate the "vicinity of insolvency," the re­
gion in which managers are said to have incentives to make excessively 
risky investments.25 Because of this problem, Delaware corporate law 
recognizes an exception to the rule that managers owe their fiduciary 
duty exclusively to shareholders. In the Credit Lyonnais case,26 Chan­
cellor William Allen opined that "in the vicinity of insolvency," the fi­
duciary duty "shifts" from being owed to shareholders to being owed 
to creditors. 
One could argue that the illustration above is merely an instance of 
a firm operating in the vicinity of insolvency. It is already well known, 
one could say, that in this vicinity, managers have incentives to make 
inefficient choices, and corporate law recognizes an exception in this 
region to the general rule that managers have a duty to maximize 
share value. For this objection to have any force, however, there must 
be some region which is outside the vicinity of insolvency: it must be 
the case that, except in unusual settings, the norm of shareholder value 
maximization does yield efficient choices. 
In fact, however, this is not the case. Rather, firms are always in 
the vicinity of insolvency because all it takes for any firm, no matter 
how solvent, to become insolvent is to lose a sufficiently risky bet.27 
One can construct for any firm, no matter how solvent (so long as it 
has debt and limited liability), a bet sufficiently risky that it would in­
crease the value of its shares, while it decreased the total value of the 
company - a bet, that is, that would be socially inefficient for the firm 
to make. For example, take very solvent firm ABC, which has assets 
of $100 million and liabilities of $10 million. By making a highly lev­
eraged bet in, say, the derivatives market, it would have, let us sup­
pose, a one in one hundred chance of gaining $10 billion, and a 99 per­
cent chance of losing the firm's entire value. This bet would have a 
present value of $10.9 million to shareholders, while it would have an 
25. See Rima F. Hartman, Note, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate Di­
rectors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761, 1766 
(1993); Stephen R. McDonnell, Comment, Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.: Insolvency 
Shifts Directors' Burden From Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 177, 209-10 
(1994). 
26. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 
Civ.A.12150, 1991WL 277613, at 1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
27. Just ask the people at Long-Tenn Capital Management. See generally Carol J. 
Loomis, A House Built On Sand: John Meriwether's Once Mighty Long-Term Capital Has 
All But Crumbled. So Why Did Warren Buffett Offer to Buy It?, FORTUNE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 
110; Anita Raghavan & Matt Murray, Financial Firms Lose $8 Billion So Far - Global 
Fallout from Russia Hits Big Banks, Others; Meriwether Fund Hurt, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 
1998, at A2; Leah Nathans Spiro, How Long-Term Rocked Stocks, Too, Bus. WK., Nov. 9, 
1998, at 160. 
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expected value to the corporation of only $1 million. The price of this 
lottery-ticket-like bet is, let us suppose, $10 million. Thus it has a net 
expected value to the corporation of negative $9 million - obviously a 
bad bet for the firm. Yet managers maximizing shareholder value 
would still choose this investment over any similarly priced bet that 
had an expected value of less than $10.9 million for the shareholders, 
even though other bets would be better for the corporation. 
That, however, has to do with the firm being in the vicinity of in­
solvency only in a trivial sense. It is just that the closer to insolvency a 
firm is, the less risky a bet has to be for its loss to push the firm into 
bankruptcy. If managers really are duty bound to maximize the value 
of shares, then they are duty bound to make inefficient choices like the 
one just illustrated as long as these choices are available, and they will 
be. The conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders, 
therefore, does not merely result in inefficient incentives when the 
firm is in the vicinity of insolvency. It exists whenever there are ineffi­
cient risky bets available that would increase share value but decrease 
firm value. In theory, and increasingly in reality, this is all the time. 
A possible reaction to my argument above would be to dismiss it as 
invoking excessively unlikely events. This reaction, however, would 
be inappropriate. It may seem that opportunities to bet the company 
on a long shot are rare and therefore that my argument does not raise 
a serious problem with the shareholder value maximization norm. 
This and other practically minded objections to my argument are 
likely based on misunderstandings of how a corporate law norm 
should function, as I discuss below. 
3. Complete Capital Markets 
It may seem that managers rarely make bets like those illustrated 
above, unless their company is about to fail. If these occurrences are 
very rare, the problems they create for fiduciary duty theory, one 
might argue, are of academic interest only. This objection, however, 
misses the point. These occurrences may be rare, but not because 
managers lack opportunities to make long-shot bets. Indeed, modern 
finance theory typically assumes (with increasing realism) the near 
completeness of capital markets.28 In complete capital markets, it is 
possible to bet on nearly any possible future world state, including low 
probability ones. Managers can, in theory, bet the company on very 
risky opportunities, and there is no reason to suppose that these op­
portunities are rare. There are an infinite number of possible invest­
ments that, while inefficient, would increase the value of a given com-
28. See JOHN c. Cox & MARK RUBENSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 43645 (1985); FRANK 
J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND lNSTRU· 
MENTS 645-50 (1992). 
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pany's stock. The claim that share-value-increasing but inefficient 
bets are not available would fly in the face of capital-market com­
pleteness, a fundamental assumption of modern finance theory.29 
The abundance of these opportunities for the firm becomes more 
obvious if one considers that bets that must be expected to lose money 
for the firm as a whole cannot be scarce as long as there are people 
willing to take the firm's money. Any risk neutral party should be 
willing to be the counter-party of a bet that has a negative expected 
value for the firm but a positive expected value for the other party. If 
firms were willing to pay an unfair price for bets, so long as they were 
risky enough, and so long as they increased share value, there could be 
no shortage of parties willing to relieve firms of their money. This sort 
of bet would amount to a collusion between equity holders and third 
parties to impose costs on the fixed claimants of the firm and split the 
benefits among themselves. This sort of behavior is hardly universal 
among managers, but not for lack of opportunity - and not because it 
would be disloyal to shareholders. 
The assumption of complete capital markets is increasingly realis­
tic. The emergence of financial derivative markets means practically 
unlimited opportunities exist for firms to bet, where they are so in­
clined, on possible but low probability future states of the world. De­
rivative debacles prove that it is entirely possible for large firms to be 
wiped out, as Barings Bank was, by huge derivative losses.30 Yet in the 
unlikely event Mr. Leeson's rogue bets on behalf of Earing's had paid 
off, its shareholders might have profited handsomely. 
B. Agency Costs 
If managers of solvent corporations do not lack the opportunity to 
make inefficient bets that would increase shareholder value, then why 
do managers rarely bet the company on long shots? It is not because 
they are loyally serving the interests of the diversified shareholders 
who figure so prominently in the conventional economic analysis of 
corporations. Managers loyal to shareholders would make such bets. 
In practice, managers apparently make these bets only when firm in­
solvency looms.31 When the firm is on the brink of bankruptcy, man-
29. See Michael J. Brennan, Corporate Finance over the Past 25 Years, FIN. MGMT. 
Su=er 1995, at 9. 
30. See Nicholas Denton, The Barings Crisis: Disaster, Just When Most Things Were 
Going Right, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1995, at 3; Peter Martin & F.T. Writers, The Barings Col­
lapse: Blunders that Bust the Bank, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1995, at 24; Richard W. Stevenson, 
Barings Fiasco: Unbridled Ambition, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 5, 1995, at Bl. 
31. See Lynn M. LoPuck i & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bank­
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993); 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991). 
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agers' interests are aligned too well with those of shareholders.32 
Managers want to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy and the loss of their 
firm-specific human capital.33 For managers, there is little solace in 
managing their firm only slightly into bankruptcy. To avoid it, they 
will take desperate chances. When the firm is comfortably solvent, the 
conventional wisdom is that managers will be more risk averse than 
relatively risk neutral shareholders would prefer. Unlike diversified 
shareholders, managers typically have specialized much of their per­
sonal wealth in one firm. Also unlike shareholders, managers typically 
do not participate fully in the upside potential of the firm. Diversified 
shareholders, it is often observed, would prefer managers to make all 
investments with a positive net discounted present value to sharehold­
ers, even if they are very risky. Managers, however, will not do this, 
being far more exposed than the shareholders to firm-specific risk. In 
fact, if investors owned only the common stock of the firm, they would 
prefer that managers undertake even riskier projects that had negative 
discounted present values, so long as the expected result would in­
crease the value of their stock. 
The divergence of the attitudes toward risk of shareholders and 
managers gives rise to agency costs in the conventional view of corpo­
rations. Manager agents will not take risks shareholder principals 
would prefer they take. This standard view goes wrong, however, by 
implicitly overvaluing the interests of shareholders. This over­
weighting stems from the assumption that managers should be ana­
lyzed as agents of diversified shareholders. But why should this be so? 
Shareholders are a legal category, not a natural category of economics. 
By analyzing firms in terms of the "shareholders," it is the conven­
tionalists who are indulging in reification.34 Legal scholars have ad­
justed their thinking to the imperative of diversification that comes 
from modern finance theory, but only as far as they may without 
leaving the legal category of the "shareholders" behind. The result is 
a hybrid that does not quite make economic sense. 
Legal scholars have not fully appreciated the extent to which mod­
ern finance has left the analysis of Berle and Means's Private Property 
and the Modem Corporation outmoded. That influential book still 
32. Interests of managers and investors are not usually perfectly aligned. See Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 11. 
33. For discussions of firm-specific human capital, see MASAHIKO AOKI, THE CO­
OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984); Gary s. Becker, Investment in Human 
Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 10 J. POL. ECON. 9 (Oct. Supp. 1962); Harry DeAngelo & 
Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 33, 34-38 (1985); 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of 
Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Benjamin Klein et al. , Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 313-19 
(1978). 
34. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996). 
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weighs heavily on corporate law scholarship. Berle and Means 
stressed that the shareholder in the modern corporation, with his mere 
atom of property, has no power to control management. Ownership 
and control are split, in their vision, producing a radioactive alienation 
that threatens to poison economic life. The remedy, they thought, was 
to recharacterize firms as virtual public utilities with public duties.35 
The rational investor of modern capital asset pricing models, viewed 
through the lens of Berle and Means, looks like an aggravated version 
of what they feared. Thus the mythology of the lost age of the active 
shareholder owner lives on into contemporary corporate scholarship. 
The diversified investor of modern finance theory, however, is not a 
particularly frightening version of Berle and Means's shareholder. It 
(usually an institution) is not a "shareholder" as we have been taught 
to think of shareholders at all. The rational investor is diversified 
across all classes of capital assets and consequently is, in spite of much 
academic cheerleading to the contrary,36 largely passive.37 If this ra­
tional investor is the starting point, what agency costs should matter? 
The agency costs that matter are properly seen as the divergence 
between what self-interested managers do and what rational investors 
would have them do. Rational investors will have a stake in that part 
of the firm's capital that trades on the debt market, just as they will 
have a stake in that part of the firm's capital that trades in the stock 
market. Thus when managers fail to be as risk neutral as diversified 
shareholders would have them be, this does not necessarily mean they 
are more averse to risk than rational investors who own a proportional 
stake in the firm's debt would have them be. This does not mean that 
the agency costs are trivial, but it does suggest that the conventional 
picture of managers as agents of "the shareholders" exaggerates 
agency costs. Rational investors will not be as risk-loving as would be 
investors holding only equity. 
If the bulk of a firm's capital comes from rational investors, inves­
tors heavily positioned in the firm's equity might nevertheless yield a 
disproportionate influence over managers. In this case, the firm­
specific investments of managers might mitigate the pressure toward 
excessive risk-taking that risk-preferring shareholders might put on 
managers. Public choice theory suggests that smaller groups with nar­
rower interests tend to wield more influence than do larger groups 
with diffuse interests. Narrow special interest lobbies are able rou­
tinely to exercise more influence in the legislative process than diffuse 
35. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 327. 
36. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays Of Warren Buffet: Lessons For 
Corporate America, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 5 (1997); Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Plain English -
Changing The Corporate Culture, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713, 718 (1997). 
37. See Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Fi­
nance, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
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groups such as taxpayers can.38 There is a danger that something 
similar may occur in the context of corporate governance. Consider a 
public corporation that has two groups of shareholders, one of which 
is fully diversified according to the CAPM mandate and another that 
has specialized in the corporation's common stock. The tendency of 
economic analysis of corporate law is to view this allocation of owner­
ship as benign, because it reduces monitoring costs. Mark Roe and 
others have argued, for example, that restrictions on ownership by fi­
nancial intermediaries of large stakes in public corporations should be 
lifted, because strong owners would make good monitors of firm man­
agers, who otherwise tend to shirk, self-deal, and otherwise generate 
excessive agency costs.39 
Having a strong "interest group" focused specifically on the value 
of the firm's stock, to the exclusion of the other financial claims 
against it, however, will not necessarily be efficient. Especially if the 
firm is highly leveraged, the specialized-equity interest group may 
have an incentive to use its influence, through the corporate govern­
ance system, to get managers to take excessive risks. This would harm 
rationally diversified investors in the firm. If the firm has more debt 
than equity in its capital structure, rational investors will own more of 
the firm's debt than its equity. Investors who own much more of the 
firm's equity than its debt may push managers to adopt inefficient 
strategies that increase the value of firm stock but decrease the value 
of firm debt by more. Thus, it seems entirely plausible that investors 
specialized in firm equity will have more influence over management 
than rationally diversified investors but quite different incentives re­
specting risk. It is partly to avoid incentive problems like these that 
leveraged buyouts sometimes impose an ownership structure requiring 
investors to buy tranches of the refinanced target's securities, so that 
they will be proportionally invested in every level of the target firm's 
capital structure after the buyout.40 Put another way, there are likely 
to be significant agency costs arising from the divergence of the inter-
38. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC Goons AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-65 (1971); KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, 
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 82-85 (1986); Gary S. Becker, A 
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 
392 (1983); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y, 671 (1995) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE 
PoLmCAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994)). 
39. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLmCAL ROOTS 
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 21-25, 263-87 (1994); see also Bernard S. Black, The 
Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 
(1992); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM.117 (1988). 
40. See Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LB Os, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, 
in DISCUSSING THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 158, 158-167 ( Donald H. Chew, 
Jr. ed. 1998). 
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ests of shareholders specializing in ownership of a particular firm, who 
act as strong owner monitors, and the interests of rational investors, 
who own not only stock but also debt of the firm. There is no reason 
to expect the interests of the former group to coincide with those of 
the latter. 
C. Taking Corporate Law Norms Seriously 
Law and economics traditionalists might concede that in some cir­
cumstances a duty to maximize the value of shares might be inefficient 
but still think this is not such a big problem. In this Section, I argue 
that this would be a misguided attitude. 
The main justification for complacency about the shareholder 
value maximization norm is probably the belief that the central prob­
lem of corporate law has been, and perhaps will always be, the agency 
costs generated by managers who are disloyal to anybody but them­
selves. One might think that loyalty by firm managers to shareholder 
interests, carried to the point where managers actually make ineffi­
cient choices, is unlikely ever to be a serious problem except "in the 
vicinity of insolvency," and that problem is already addressed in doc­
trine. One could also suppose that the enforcement costs necessary to 
bring about perfect compliance of managerial behavior with the 
shareholder value maximization norm would be so great that they 
would not be justified by the marginal benefits to shareholders. So 
shareholders would not want perfect compliance with the norm in any 
event. 
This is the kind of seemingly practical argument that often appeals 
to corporate law scholars. On reflection, however, it is wrongheaded. 
In fact, the argument could be rephrased as saying that under real­
world conditions, the norm of maximizing shareholder value is a good 
approximation of the norm of maximizing the total value of the corpo­
ration. The claim would be that managers have sufficient incentives to 
be disloyal so that loyalty to shareholders to, the point of inefficiency, 
that is to the point where shareholder value is increased at the cost of 
decreasing total firm value, is unlikely ever to be a problem. This ar­
gument, however, has to invoke implicitly the very norm of firm value 
maximization. It defends the shareholder value maximization norm 
by implicit reference to what is functioning as the real, underlying 
norm, namely the maximization of firm value, or efficiency. If it does 
not do that, it is difficult to imagine what the defense of shareholder 
value maximization could possibly be. Even if one were to concede 
that in standard settings, maximizing shareholder value (as far as man­
agers can practically be made to do it) does maximize firm value, what 
is the proponent of shareholder value maximization supposed to say to 
the hypothetical situation in which maximizing shareholder value does 
not maximize firm value? What could possibly be the economic justi-
230 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:214 
fication for maximizing shareholder value under these circumstances 
anyway? There is the fallback position - that shareholder value 
maximization is what creditors have agreed to and that shareholder 
value maximization is just enforcing the corporate contract. But this is 
simply begging the question - forgetting conveniently that from the 
beginning we are discussing what the gap-filling default rules should 
be. By hypothesis, creditors have not agreed to shareholder value 
maximization. If they had agreed to it, then there would be nothing to 
discuss. (I discuss the claim that corporate contracts with creditors re­
quire no gap filling in more detail in the next Section.) 
Proponents of shareholder value maximization must, therefore, ei­
ther implicitly invoke the firm value maximization/conventional effi­
ciency norm if they defend shareholder value maximization by claim­
ing it is efficient in all but exotic cases, or implausibly assert that 
corporate contracts with creditors are, uniquely in the world of con­
tracts, gapless. Furthermore, even if shareholder value maximization 
may be the efficient norm in all but exotic circumstances, this would 
seem less than a compelling reason for not explicitly using a norm that 
should be efficient in all circumstances, even exotic ones. The idea 
that corporate managers are under a general duty to maximize the 
value of the corporation has the virtues of unity and coherence, which 
make it easier to understand and easier to explain.41 
41. A defense of shareholder value maximization might take yet another form, but one 
that is equally unpersuasive. One might claim shareholder value maximization is what one 
might call a supererogatory norm. This is a normative prescription that takes a hyperbolic 
form, as if to take into account the probability of human weakness. Thus a general obliga­
tion to be generous to the poor might take the form of an ethical prescription (such as some 
might read into the New Testament, for example) to give all one's belongings to the poor. 
One might think there is little danger that people will take this prescription so much to heart 
that they will actually inefficiently impoverish themselves, but they may take it seriously 
enough to actually live up to the real underlying obligation, which is to be generous to the 
poor. Similarly, one might state an ethical obligation in an unqualified way, also so as to 
take account of this "discount," when one in fact would admit of exceptions. Similarly, the 
norm "maximize shareholder value" might be the formula that managers, inclined to serve 
their own interests rather than those of the firm anyway, would respond to best, not actually 
maximizing shareholder value, which would harm themselves and not even be efficient, but, 
urged on by the norm's various enforcement mechanisms, take actions to some degree con­
sistent with efficiency. There are, however, at least two problems with this view. First, it is 
imprecise. Neither managers nor their critics can derive from this supererogatory norm clear 
instructions about what they should and should not do. Second, this supererogatory norm is 
parasitic upon the norm of efficiency. We must still justify the overstatement of "maximize 
shareholder value" in terms of the norm we really adhere to, which presumably is maximiz­
ing firm value. This position would seem difficult to hold, however, in instances in which the 
maximization of share value and that of firm value actually conflict, which is the case with 
which we are primarily concerned. 
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D. Contracts with Shareholders and Creditors and 
Duties to Bondholders 
231 
Proponents of shareholder wealth maximization disagree with 
writers who argue that corporate directors should owe a fiduciary duty 
to the bondholders of the corporation as well as to shareholders.42 
Shareholder wealth advocates affirm the corporate law doctrine that 
while shareholders benefit from the fiduciary duty owed them, bond­
holders have a relationship with the corporation that is strictly con­
tractual - at least in the sense that managers owe them no fiduciary 
duty.43 The idea that creditors, including bondholders, have a relation­
ship with the corporation which is strictly contractual is well-estab­
lished corporate law doctrine.44 
The debate over whether bondholders ought to benefit from a fi­
duciary duty has taken place against the obscuring background of ar­
guments over "contractual" versus communitarian views of the corpo­
ration. 45 In this setting, the term "contract" gets confusing. 
42. Quite an extensive literature has developed on this topic. See, e.g., Bainbridge, su­
pra note 3; William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 
1984 WIS. L. REV. 667, 735-39 {1984); John C. Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 826 {1988); J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Con­
trolling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 16 {1987); 
Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The Corporation, the Bondholder and Fiduciary 
Duties, 10 J.L. & COM. 187, 209 {1991); Hideki Kanda, Debtholders and Equityholders, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 431 {1992); Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156, 1173 {1993); Jeffrey G. Macintosh, Designing an Efficient Fidu­
ciary Law, 43 U. TORONTO LJ. 425 {1993); Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 4; 
Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining The Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and 
Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 {1995); Dale B. 
Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate 
Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1; Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduci­
ary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 {1996). 
43. Courts have traditionally held that managers owe no fiduciary duty to bondholders. 
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25 {S.D.N.Y. 
1989); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988); Speer v. Dighton Grain, Inc., 624 
P.2d 952, 961 {Kan. 1981); Merriman v. Smith, 599 S.W.2d 548, 552-56 {Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); 
Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 {Del. Ch. 1986). 
44. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §10.05, at 556 {1993); C. 
HUGH FRIEDMAN, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CORPORATIONS CH. 6-c, 'l!6:247.24 
{Westlaw 1984); WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §6-2, at 220 (5th ed. 1993). 
45. See Albert H. Barkey, The Financial Articulation of a Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders 
with Fiduciary Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 47 {1986); 
Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595 {1997) 
[hereinafter Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty]; Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondhold­
ers and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821 {1992) 
[hereinafter Brudney, Corporate Bondholders]; Michael E. Debow & Dwight R. Lee, Share­
holders, Nonshareholders and Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 
18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393 {1993); David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders' Rights and the Case for a 
Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1023 (1991); David Millon, Communitarianism in 
Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
LAW, supra note 4, at 1-33; Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 4; Mitchell, supra 
note 4; Mitchell, supra note 1; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate 
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Contractarians argue that the corporation is best understood as a 
nexus of contracts and that the relationship of shareholders to the firm 
is essentially contractual.46 They also argue that shareholders are 
beneficiaries of a fiduciary duty, while bondholders have only a con­
tractual relationship with the firm.47 But what does this mean? If the 
corporation is a nexus of contracts, is not everyone's relationship 
within the nexus contractual? Contractarians must be using the term 
contract in two different senses, one literal and one more metaphori­
cal. 
Corporate-law contractarians argue that those who provide the 
firm with inputs agree to certain terms specified by provisions of statu­
tory corporate law, the firm's articles of incorporation and bylaws, and 
other rules that govern the claims of the various input providers. 
These rules are not part of a literal contract, but a contract is still a 
good model of the voluntary, self-interested arrangement that consti­
tutes a joint business venture among many different parties. "Con­
tract" is used here as a metaphor or analogy that captures the essence 
of the actual web of voluntary arrangements. The idea is similar to, 
but not nearly as fanciful as, the classic description of fundamental so­
cial relations as a "social contract."48 
It would be impractical for any input provider to specify this 
"contract" in complete detail.49 The costs of trying to make the 
Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 {1990); O'Connor, Restructuring, supra note 9; Orts, 
supra note 5. But see Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 856, 904 n.22. 
46. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 37-39; Alchian & Demsetz, supra 
note 11, at 787-89 & n.14; Bebchuck, Contractual Freedom, supra note 11, at 1397; Henry N. 
Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV., Summer 1989, 
at 99; William J. Camey, The ALi's Corporate Governance Project: The Death of Property 
Rights?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 898, 900, 905-11 {1993); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, 
and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1706 (1989); 
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 310-11. 
47. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 38; Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 
1443; Macey, supra note 7, at 36-39; C. Robert Morris, Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent 
Corporations: A Comment on Credit Lyonnais, 19 J. CORP. L. 61 (1993); Tauke, supra note 
42; Van Der Weide, supra note 42, at31-32. 
48. See, e.g., SOCIAL CONTRACT: EsSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU (Ernest 
Barker ed., 1948); THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS (David Bouche & 
Paul Kelly eds., 1994); Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classi­
cal Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 849 n.363 (1985). 
49. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & 
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic 
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) 
[hereinafter Strategic Contractual Inefficiency]; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: 
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 873 (1992); Gillian K. Hadfield, 
Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 
(1994); Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1987, 1999 (1996); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: 
A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 216 (1992); Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: 
The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391 (1992) 
(reviewing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3) [hereinafter Ayres, Making a Difference]. 
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corporate "contract" complete would be greater than the benefits. 
Instead of attempting to spell out completely all of the duties 
managers owe shareholders, the standard contractualist now holds 
that corporate law subjects managers to a broad fiduciary duty. 
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, leading proponents of the 
contractual view of the corporation, the fiduciary relationship is 
characterized by its open-endedness. Bondholders, Easterbrook and 
Fischel would agree, are also participants in the corporate "contract." 
They are among the parties who pool their resources in the firm. 
Unlike shareholders, however, bondholders do have a literal, detailed 
contract with the firm. Gaps in the bondholders' contract are smaller 
and fewer than those in the shareholders' "contract" because the costs 
of specifying the former contract are lower. This difference in cost is 
partly due to the difference in the nature of their claims. The fixed 
claims of creditors must be protected against a relatively known and 
describable set of threats such as fraudulent transfers and 
subordination to other creditors. Creditors typically get certain 
"boilerplate" proscriptions built into their contracts that limit the risk 
that the firm will fail to fulfill its obligations.50 Because the 
relationship between the firm and bondholders is not so open-ended, 
50. On bond covenants generally, see Clifford W. Smith, Jr. et al., Financial Engineer­
ing: Why Hedge?, in THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 126, 132-34, and ( Clif­
ford W. Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson eds., 1990); and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. 
Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 
(1979). For discussions of shareholder-bondholder conflict, see Avner Kalay, Stockholder­
Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints, 10 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (1982); Rose­
Ackennan, supra note 31; and George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imper­
fect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1992). For discussion of poison put bond cove­
nants, see Leland Crabbe, Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders and "Super 
Poison Put" Bond Covenants, 46 J. FIN. 689 (1991), and Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, 
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boiler­
plate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997). Also of interest are the following: Elazar Berkovitch & 
E. Han Kim, Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over- and Under-Investment In­
centives, 45 J. FIN. 765 (1990); William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal 
Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE LJ. 92; John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. 
Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and 
Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1216 n27 (1991); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, 
The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & 
ECON. 463 (1996); Mai E. Iskandar-Datta & Douglas R. Emery, An Empirical Investigation 
of the Role of Indenture Provisions in Determining Bond Ratings, 18 J. BANKING & FIN. 93 
(1994); Ileen Malitz, On Financial Contracting: The Determinants of Bond Covenants, FIN. 
MGMT, Summer 1986, at 15; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in 
Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931 
(1993) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Antitakover Provisions in Bonds]; Marcel Kahan, 
The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 565 (1995) 
[hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds]; 
Gene Laber, Bond Covenants and Forgone Opportunities: The Case of Burlington Northern 
Railroad Company, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1992, at 71, 72 n.l; Kenneth Lehn & Annette 
Poulsen, Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts, 
34 J.L. & ECON. 645 (1991); ILEEN B. MALITZ, THE MODERN ROLE OF BOND COVENANTS 
43-44 (1993); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW 
413 (1986). 
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bondholders do not need or get the benefits of a fiduciary duty owed 
to them, in the standard view. Maximizing the value of equity, on the 
other hand, involves entrepreneurs seeing opportunities others do not 
see and making the most of them.51 This duty is unavoidably much 
more vague. 
The corporate "contract" with shareholders thus has great need of 
a gap-filling principle provided by the fiduciary duty, while the con­
tract with fixed claimants on the firm needs it much less. This point, 
stressed by many corporate scholars, is well taken, but tends to be ex­
aggerated. It does not imply that contracts with creditors do not also 
need a gap-filling principle. All contracts have gaps.52 Contractors 
cannot anticipate all future contingencies. While the nature of bond­
holder claims is profoundly different from that of equity, both variable 
and fixed corporate claimants will have need of principles to fill the 
gaps in their incompletely specified voluntary arrangements. 
Economic analysts of corporate law, however, taking Easterbrook 
and Fischel as exemplary, have tended to suggest that contracts with 
debt holders never need gap filling because contracting costs are so 
low. Yet this assumption is too implausible to bear scrutiny. For it to 
be true, contracting with debt holders would have to be costless, which 
obviously it is not.53 In their book The Economic Structure of Corpo­
rate Law, Easterbrook and Fischel seem to argue - but they are not 
entirely clear on this point - that corporate law reserves fiduciary 
duty for voluntary arrangements that are especially open-ended, like 
that between the firm and shareholders. In their later work, however, 
they seem to take a somewhat different position, arguing that the doc­
trine of fiduciary duty corresponds to no distinctive economic reality.54 
51. See FREDERICK BANARD HAWLEY, ENTERPRISE AND THE PRODUCTIVE PROCESS 
(1907); ISRAEL KlRzNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973); FRANK H. 
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921); Patrick J. Gunning, The Meaning of 
Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory: Historical Perspective, in 1 ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 
INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC CHANGE (1992). 
52. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, supra note 49; 
Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 49, at 730; Barnett, supra 
note 49; Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and 
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 639 (1989); Ayres, Making a 
Difference, supra note 49. 
53. For bond contracts to be literally gapless, contracting costs would have to be zero 
(or vanishingly small) because there are an infinite number of contingencies that potentially 
may affect payment and other important features of the bonds. Only if contracting costs 
were vanishingly small would it be economical for the bond contract to spell out the parties' 
rights and duties under all circumstances that might conceivably arise. See, e.g., Ayres & 
Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 49; Per-Olof Bjuggren, A Transaction 
Cost Perspective on Financial Distress and Capital Structure, 15 IN1L. REV. L. & ECON. 395 
(1995); Brudney, Corporate Bondholders, supra note 45; Frank H. Easterbrook, High-Yield 
Debt as an Incentive Device, 11 IN1L. REV. L. & ECON. 183 (1991); Joseph McLaughlin, 
Challenges to Underwriters and Their Counsel in the Modern Capital Markets Environment, 
792 PLI/CORP 401 (1992). 
54. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 91. 
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Rather, they argue, the efficient allocations of benefits and duties are 
different in different economic settings. Thus in each of the different 
settings of business corporations, labor unions, and trusts, fiduciary 
duty has a different content. 
Yet in all cases, they argue, the principles imposed by the law are 
nevertheless those to which rational parties would have agreed ex 
ante. In trust law, corporate law, labor law, and other areas, "fiduciary 
duty" thus means the same thing but also different things: the same 
thing because in each area the law requires fiduciaries to do the effi­
cient thing, what rational parties would have agreed to ex ante; but 
also different things because in different settings, rational parties 
would agree to different things. For example, Easterbrook and Fis­
chel suggest that the fiduciary duties of labor union officials are less 
stringent than those of ordinary trustees because union members can 
hold officials accountable more readily than trust beneficiaries can 
trustees.55 
In this Article, I am concerned only with fiduciary duty for pur­
poses of corporate law. I am not trying to develop here a theory that 
works for all of the many applications of fiduciary duty, or even to 
suggest such a thing is possible. I do take it, however, that a hypo­
thetical bargain analysis - asking what parties would have agreed to 
ex ante, as a proxy for what is efficient - is at the core of Easterbrook 
and Fischel's analysis of the corporate fiduciary duty. My point is that 
this sort of analysis, correctly applied, leads to unexpected results, re­
sults whose simplicity and elegance ought to recommend them to 
those who prize coherence in legal theory. In particular, hypothetical 
bargain analysis is just as applicable to contracts between the firm and 
creditors, and other fixed claimants, as it is to the "contract" between 
the firm and shareholders. Indeed, it would be strange if the applica­
tion of contract law's hypothetical bargain analysis to corporate law 
were appropriate for metaphorical (shareholder) contracts but not for 
real (bond) contracts. Real contracts are, after all, the sort of con­
tracts the default rules of which hypothetical bargain theory was used 
to explore in the first place. The obligations owed by managers to 
creditors are usually not characterized in law as fiduciary. The gaps in 
the specification of obligations to fixed claimants, however, have to be 
filled, as a normative matter of efficiency, just as do the larger gaps in 
"contracts" with shareholders, by a principle that requires managers to 
do what rational parties would have agreed to ex ante. 
E. Fiduciary Duty and Gapless Contracts with Creditors 
This appropriate stress on what investors would have agreed to ex 
55. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. 
& ECON. 425, 437 (1993). 
236 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 98:214 
ante decouples two points which together cause confusion. It is natu­
ral to suppose that if creditors such as bondholders have essentially an 
express contractual relationship with the firm, then there is little gap 
filling for any fiduciary principle to do in the creditors' contracts with 
the firm, and the fiduciary principle should be thought of mainly as a 
principle that completes the shareholders ' contract with the firm. In a 
sense, this is correct, but it is also misleading. Even if it is the case that 
bondholder contracts with the firm are gapless, it is still a mistake to 
imagine that the hypothetical contract from which we derive corporate 
fiduciary duty arises from negotiations between or among "the share­
holders" and anybody else. It is a logical mistake to infer from the 
completeness of bond contracts, and the idleness of fiduciary duty as a 
gap filler in that context, that shareholders, rather than rational inves­
tors more generally, are the only parties to the hypothetical corporate 
contract. Ironically, this logical mistake, which I believe subtly ani­
mates much of corporate contractualist analysis of fiduciary duty, is an 
instance of reification. It is as if contractualists imagine there are 
shareholders and bondholders in the hall where the corporate contract 
is being negotiated. Because contracting costs are lower for bond­
holders, they finish negotiating their contracts first and leave. The 
shareholders remain and have to settle on the broad fiduciary duty be­
cause to specify their contracts completely would be too costly. 
Thinking of shareholders in this way, however, reifies them as a sepa­
rate class. Sixty years of Berle- and Means-influenced thinking makes 
it difficult not to do so. Nevertheless, reifying shareholders this way 
has no warrant in modem finance theory. Shareholders as a separate 
class, the Berle and Means "owners,"' represent a nostalgic longing for 
a political economy that never existed.56 In any event, modem finance 
theory has little room for them. Rational investors are not exclusively 
shareholders, but are widely diversified across asset classes. The di­
versified investors who hypothetically negotiate the corporate contract 
will internalize the costs and benefits of different fiduciary rules to the 
bonds they hold whether or not there are gaps in bond contracts. 
They will only agree to a fiduciary rule that calls for gaps to be filled in 
the corporate "contract" with the principle of the maximization of 
56. For the flavor of this, see the elegiac last chapter in A.A. BERLE & V.J. PEDERSON, 
LIQUID CLAIMS AND NATIONAL WEALTH 199 {1934). Berle and Pederson opine, 
Plainly, there is more than a material loss in this dissolution of the element of property. The 
loss is at least equally spiritual. Possession of a liquid asset gives him a momentary possibil­
ity to fulfill his desire; and projects that possibility into the future; but the thing it gives him 
is precisely that and no more. It does not give him necessarily the possibility to create; and it 
precludes (at least to the extent of these assets) any possibility of having a function in terms 
of property. There is no escape from the fact that the truly liquid asset is a dead asset; as it 
enters into production it becomes less liquid; what has happened has been the splitting of the 
atom of property so that he has the dead part, and someone else the living. 
Id. at 203. The influence of this kind of progressive romanticism in American legal thought 
deserves an essay in its own right. 
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firm value, not shareholder value, even if we imagine bond contracts 
were gapless. 
So far I have only sketched the argument for taking the maximiza­
tion of firm value as the principle to which these rational parties would 
agree as the appropriate norm for filling gaps in corporate contracts. 
In the following Part, I argue in more detail that this is the rule ra­
tional investors in corporations would choose as a gap filler. 
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL BARGAIN AMONG RATIONAL 
CORPORATE !NVESTORS 
In their influential book on corporate law,57 Easterbrook and 
Fischel express the standard view that "the holders of [residual 
claims]," who "bear the marginal risks of the firm[,] . . .  have the best 
incentives to make the optimal investment and management decisions 
[for the firm] - not perfect, just best."58 In fact, this standard view is 
quite wrong, and the confident assumption of this proposition as 
economic truth is the source of perhaps subtle, but deep and 
persistent, confusion in corporate law scholarship. In fact, as the 
examples above show, the incentives of residual claimants are too risk­
preferring to be efficient. They would have managers increase the 
value of residual claims even if it decreased the total value of financial 
claims against the firm, and they would always have these incentives, 
not just in unusual cases. So who does have the best incentives to 
make optimal investment and management decisions for the firm? It 
turns out this question has a pleasing answer. It is rational investors. 
Since they are proportionally invested in all the financial claims on the 
firm, just as CAPM mandates, they have these optimal incentives. 
Thus the diversified portfolio that CAPM mandates is also the 
portfolio which, when held by rational investors, gives them precisely 
the correct incentives to make, or to influence management to make, 
"the optimal investment and management decisions" for the firm. 
Rational investors, not shareholders, have the best incentives. 
Why do Easterbrook and Fischel miss this point? Were one to ask 
them, "best of whose incentives to make optimal decisions?" their an­
swer would presumably be, "best among shareholders, preferred 
shareholders, junior creditors, senior creditors, and so on - best of 
the various classes in the capital structure of the firm."59 But these 
57. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3. 
58. Id. at 91. 
59. I do not address the complicated issues involved in duties firm decisionmakers might 
owe to workers, communities, and "other constituencies" of the corporation. This is because 
conventionally, human capital is not included in the portfolios that modem portfolio theory 
describes. This is obviously a serious limitation of modem portfolio theory. Ravi Jaganna­
than and Zhenyu Wang argue that if the market index is redefined to include human capital 
and betas are allowed to vary with the cyclical fluctuations in the economy, beta becomes a 
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categories are imposed by law, not finance. Easterbrook and Fischel, 
for all their economic sophistication, remain trapped in the antique 
world of Berle and Means. To maximize the value of its portfolio, a 
rational investor must be shareholder, senior bondholder, and every­
thing in between, all at once. To have the right incentives to maximize 
the value of the firm, the rational investor must have the correct incen­
tives respecting investment and management decisions of the firm. 
And the rational investor will have those incentives as a natural con­
sequence of diversifying its portfolio to maximize value. Thus diversi­
fication theory, management's incentives to maximize the value of in­
vestment in the firm, and the normative content of corporate law are 
all tightly linked, but not in the way economic corporate law scholar­
ship has heretofore explained. It is not "the shareholders," but ra­
tional investors, by virtue of diversifying to maximize the value of 
their portfolios, who have the best (indeed, with the usual strong as­
sumptions, perfect) incentives to maximize the value of the firm. 
Once this point is grasped, a socially efficient corporate law norm 
is not difficult to formulate. It is simply that managers should make 
the decision, such as the investment choice, that maximizes the value 
of the firm.60 This does not necessarily entail maximizing the value of 
the residual claims, such as common stock, of the firm but rather en­
tails maximizing the total value of all financial claims on the firm. In 
the example in Part I above, managers would be violating this rule by 
choosing Investment 2 over Investment 1, even if Investment 2 were 
better for shareholders. In the next Section, I show how hypothetical 
bargain analysis leads to this result. 
much better predictor of returns on assets. See Ravi Jagannathan & Z henyu Wang, The 
Conditional CAPM and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns, 51 J. FIN. 3 (1996). One 
could imagi ne a very ambitious theory that would defe nd a general version of fiduciary duty 
that would fill all gaps in the corp orate contract depending on what would max imiz e the to· 
tal value of all assets, including human capital, that were contractually committed to the cor­
poration. Such a theory might, however, not give workers more protection than they cur­
rently have. Moreover, hypothetical contract analysis that uses highly diversified investor s  
a s  its personnel i s  more appealing i n  settl ing gap-fill ing principles fo r contracts with financial 
claimants than it would be fo r firm contracts with human capital investors. Treating share­
holders as if they were diversified across asset classes is not grossly unrealistic, and it is not 
normatively offensive, because it treats shareholders as doing what they should be doing 
anyway. Considerations such as the decreasing marginal utility of wealth become relevant, 
however, in considering defa ult rules governin g  confl icts of financial and human capital pro­
viders. 
60. Cf. Barkey, supra note 45. Bark ey argues fo r a duty of " global wealth max imiz a­
tion" which is similar to the proposal I make in this Article. He argues, however, that this 
duty follows from Black-Scholes option-pricing theory, mak ing a connection I am not sure I 
fo llow. He seems to mean that under option-pricing theory, a bondholder is in a sense a re­
sidual claimant and as such should benefit from a fiduciary duty. As I ex plain in Section 
IV. A.l, I think the idea that fiduciary duty should fo llow from the residual status of a claim 
is just a mistake. He also seems to reject the idea that investors woul d  be indifferent to 
maximiz ing firm value via wealth transfe rs from bondholders to stock holders or vice versa. 
Instead, he suggests the firm should have to compensate bondholders fo r  such " ex propria­
tions." I do not endorse that view. I also find Barkey' s  article opaque at several crucial 
points. See id. at 69. 
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A. Rational Corporate Investors 
Hypothetical bargain analysis61 determines what rule hypothetical 
investors in a public corporation would agree to ex ante to fill gaps in 
the corporate contract. The first step in the analysis is to characterize 
the investors and describe what rational behavior on their part is. The 
second step is to explain which corporate law norm rational investors 
of the sort described would pick. 
I take corporate investors for purposes of this analysis to be per­
fect adherents of CAPM - the Capital Assets Pricing Model. CAPM 
is not uncontroversial, but it remains the leading asset pricing model 
and a central tenant of modern finance.62 In any event, my purpose 
here is not to defend CAPM but to use CAPM as the best available · 
description of rational investment behavior. 
CAPM is familiar to modern corporate law scholars. It is standard 
in the corporate law literature to take into account the consequence of 
CAPM that rational investors will be highly diversified. For example, 
in Easterbrook and Fischel's critique of laws regulating takeovers and 
61. The literature on hypothetical bargaining theory is huge. See, e.g., BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 46-72 (1984); RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-85 (3d ed. 1986); Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in In­
complete Contracts, supra note 49; Bainbridge, supra note 9; Barnett, supra note 49; Lisa 
Bernstein, Social Nonns and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993); 
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom, supra note 11, at 1824; Daniel P. Bradney, Hypo­
thetical Consent and Moral Force, 10 LAW & PHIL. 235 (1991); David Charny, Hypothetical 
Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991); 
Clark, supra note 46; John C. Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: 
An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Coleman et al., supra note 
52; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 271, 271-79, 283-99 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Cor­
porate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 702 (1982); [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fis­
che� Corporate Control Transactions]; Theodore Eisenberg, Symposium on the Law and 
Economics of Bargaining Commentary on 'On The Nature of Bankruptcy': Bankruptcy and 
Bargaining, 75 VA. L. REV. 205 (1989); Thomas Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature 
of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 
(1989); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract De­
fault Rules, 100 YALE LJ. 615 (1990); Robert A. Long, Jr., A Theory of Hypothetical Con­
tract, 94 YALE LJ. 415 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, Courts and Corporations: A Comment 
on Coffee, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1692 (1989); Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts In 
Unincorporated Finns, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537 (1997); Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed 
Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171 (1995); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation In 
Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987); Ayres, Making a Difference, supra note 
49. 
62. See, e.g., RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD s. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
CORPORATE ACQUISISITONS 101 (2d ed. 1995); Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, 
Stakeholders, and Bagholders (Or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 
Bus. LAW. 429, 478 (1998); Jeffrey S. Glaser, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Risk Valua­
tion, Judicial Interpretation, and Market Bias, 50 Bus. LAW. 687, 716 (1995); D. Gordon 
Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons From Kmart, 74 N.C. 
L. REV. 1037, 1066 (1996); Cheol S. Eun, The Benchmark Beta, CAPM, and Pricing Anoma­
lies, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 330 (1994); Risk and Return: Capital-asset Pricing Model, 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 1991, at 72; Three Pioneers of Finance, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 1990, at 99. 
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tender offers, they consider how different rules would affect diversi­
fied stock investors who own stock in both takeover targets and poten­
tial acquirers.63 A law that resulted in losses to the value of acquirer 
stock that were greater than gains realized in the value of target stock 
would be inefficient from the viewpoint of the diversified stockholder. 
There is little disagreement that shareholder welfare has to be consid­
ered in light of the fact that in modem finance theory, rational share­
holders are diversified. 
While corporate law scholars assume that CAPM tells sharehold­
ers to diversify, they usually seem to assume, however, that this means 
merely that rational shareholders should own stock in at least a certain 
number of different firms.64 The diversification that CAPM actually 
prescribes goes well beyond this. A striking result of CAPM is its 
demonstration that a rational investor will hold a "market portfolio" 
and either buy risk-free assets or borrow at the risk-free rate, as neces­
sary to maximize portfolio value in light of the particular rational in­
vestor's attitude toward risk.65 The market portfolio is the aggregation 
of everyone's financial holdings. Since under CAPM every investor's 
portfolio of risky assets is identical, every rational investor must own a 
slice, bigger or smaller, of the market portfolio. Thus under CAPM, 
every rational investor holds the same portfolio of risky assets: each 
risky asset portfolio is a bigger or smaller slice of the same pie. But, 
bigger or smaller, each slice has the same ingredients and has them in 
the same proportions as every other slice and as the pie as a whole. 
The weights of various types of risky assets in each rational investor's 
63. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man­
agement to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 {1981). 
64. See Smith, supra note 37. 
65. For some discussions of CAPM in the last ten years, see THOMAS E. COPELAND & J. 
FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY 185-211 (2d ed. 1983); Ed­
ward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Con­
tract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189 {1995); Law­
rence A. Cunningham, Conversations from the Warren Buffett Symposium, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 719 {1997); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Introduction to the Warren Buffett Symposium 
Papers, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 221 {1997); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 
J. FIN. 1575 {1991); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the 
Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 1 {1993); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. 
French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427 {1992); Nicholas L. 
Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed Traders?, 16 INTL. REV. 
L. & ECON. 417 {1996); Glaser, supra note 62; Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: 
The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 
YALE L.J. 1457, 1498 & n.247 (1993); Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of 
Prevention: Meeting the Fiduciary Duty to Monitor an Index Fund Through Relationship In­
vesting, 20 J. CORP. L. 413 {1995); Louis Lowenstein, Efficient Market Theory: Let the Pun­
ishment Fit the Crime, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925 {1994); Robert F. Reilly, The Use and 
Misuse of CAPM, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 29 {1994); Smith, supra note 37; Lynn A. Stout, 
How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncer­
tainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475 {1997); and Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A 
Lawyer's Guide to Modem Valuation Techniques in Mergers and Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 
457 {1996). 
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portfolio are thus the same under CAPM. If stock represents 25% of 
all assets in the capital market, every rational investor will have a port­
folio of risky assets that consists of 25% stock by weight. If stock of 
XYZ corporation represents 1/nth of a percent of all assets in the capi­
tal market, the ideally rational investor would hold 1/nth of a percent 
of her portfolio in XYZ stock. While the risky asset portfolios of ra­
tional investors under CAPM are identical, investors will differ, ac­
cording to their risk preferences, in the amount they invest in risk-free 
assets or how much they borrow at the risk-free rate ("leveraging") to 
buy more risky assets. CAPM therefore pictures rational investors as 
being far more diversified than just owning twenty different kinds of 
stock, even though corporate law scholars often incorrectly assume 
that CAPM's diversification mandate is fulfilled for practical purposes 
by owning twenty or so different types of stock.66 Ideal CAPM inves­
tors in fact are diversified across all classes of capital assets and hold 
particular assets in proportion to the percent that the class of assets 
represents of the capital market as a whole. 
Critics of CAPM often object to its idealization and the lack of re­
alism in its assumptions.67 While not unassailable, CAPM has empiri­
cal support,68 and perhaps more telling, no better, inconsistent theory 
seems currently available. Whatever the validity of criticisms of 
CAPM on grounds of realism might be, however, they would seem out 
of place in a critique of hypothetical bargain analysis, a type of analy­
sis which inevitably involves idealization. Hypothetical bargain analy­
sis looks at what ideally rational parties would do if they knew certain 
things ex ante. To reject the exercise because it employs idealizations 
is to reject the hypothetical bargain methodology entirely. One may 
certainly do this. A general defense of hypothetical bargain theory is 
beyond the scope of this Article. My point is that, as a standard tool 
of economic analysis of corporate law and the basis of current thinking 
on the economics of corporate fiduciary duty, hypothetical bargain 
66. See Smith, supra note 37, at 22. 
67. See LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 195-208 
(1991); Brennan, supra note 29; Eun, supra note 62; Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by 
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE LJ. 239, 253-56 (1984); 
Jagannathan & Wang, supra note 59, at 4; Burton G. Malkiel & Yexiao Xu, Risk and Return 
Revisited, 23 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., No. 3, at 9 (1997); Stout, supra note 65; Richard Roll, 
What Every CFO Should Know About Scientific Progress in Financial Economics: What Is 
Known and What Remains to Be Resolved, FIN. MGMT., June 23, 1994, at 69; Robert 
Teitelman, The Revolt Against Free-Market Finance. (A Group of Thinkers and Practitioners 
Reject Current Free-Market Economic Beliefs), INS1TIUTIONAL INVESTOR, June, 1992, at 37; 
Wayne H. Wagner, Ten Myths and Twenty Years of Betas, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Sept. 22, 
1994, at 79; Beta Beaten, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 1992, at 87; Tales from the FAR Side -
Financial Markets' Evaluation of Risk Determines the Way Firms Invest. What If the Markets 
Are Wrong? I Judging Risk, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1996, at 86. 
68. A nice assessment of the current status of CAPM debate can be found in the most 
recent edition of the classic popular investors' guide, BURTON G. MAI.KIEL, A RANDOM 
WALK DOWNWALLSTREET251-76 (1996). 
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analysis leads to results different from those usually supposed. Since 
CAPM is the theoretical ground for using diversified investors in eco­
nomic analysis of corporate law at all, it makes sense to model inves­
tors as complying with the CAPM mandate closely. To do otherwise 
would require some theoretical justification, and none is apparent. 
Defenders of shareholder value maximization who want to rely on hy­
pothetical bargain analysis would have to have some reason for using 
shareholders rather than rational CAPM investors in their model, but 
if they are invoking CAPM for supposing shareholders are diversified, 
it is arbitrary not to model investors as being as diversified as CAPM 
would have them be. If we take rational CAPM investors as the right 
personnel for our model, then the next question is, what corporate law 
norm would they choose? 
To begin to answer this question, one can first note that under 
CAPM, rational investors will not divide themselves up into stock­
holders and bondholders. So when we imagine the hypothetical bar­
gaining setting in which various claimants on the corporation are set­
tling on their gap-filling principle, we do not have to distinguish 
between stockholders and bondholders. Under CAPM, we have in­
vestors whose risky asset portfolios are identical as far as their weights 
are concerned. They differ from one another only in the size of their 
portfolios, and in how they lever or unlever them to take account of 
their risk preferences. 
B. The Efficient Corporate Law Norm 
Rational investors thus have risky asset portfolios that are identical 
as regards the weights of various risky assets. Consequently, they will 
not find it hard to agree on a gap-filling rule. They will agree on a 
simple rule: managers should make the choice that will maximize the 
value of rational investors' diversified portfolios. 
This result conflicts with the accepted wisdom of what efficiency 
prescribes for a corporate law norm. If our gap-filling principle is to 
"maximize the value of rational investors' diversified portfolios," then 
shareholder value will not always be maximized. Consider again the 
rational investor's portfolio of risky assets. Consisting as it does of a 
representative sampling of all capital assets on the market, it will in­
clude both stocks and bonds of every firm, including XYZ corpora­
tion. If XYZ managers face a choice between two investments (such 
as Investment 1 and Investment 2 above) - the second of which will 
increase the value of stock, but by less than it decreases the value of 
bonds, and the first of which will increase the sum of the value of stock 
and bonds, even though it would increase stock value by less than the 
second investment - rational investors will unambiguously prefer that 
managers choose the first investment. The first investment would not 
maximize the value of investors' shares, but it would maximize the 
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value of their diversified portfolios. Rational investors in the hypo­
thetical contract setting would reject the norm "maximize shareholder 
value," because it would result (to the extent it was followed) in some 
investment choices that reduced the value of their diversified portfo­
lios. Their preferred instruction to managers would instead be to "do 
things that increase the value of our diversified portfolios." Managers 
could then do things that reduced the value of bonds (unless prohib­
ited by actual contract terms) only if they increased the value of stock 
by more. 
C. From Portfolios to Corporations 
The efficient norm for corporate law is different from shareholder 
wealth maximization not only in substance but in form as well. Be­
cause the norm is derived from what rational CAPM investors would 
choose in a hypothetical bargain, and these investors are diversified 
across classes of capital assets, the norm cannot be formulated as be­
ing owed exclusively or primarily to any one legal class of asset hold­
ers. If the object is to maximize the value of a diversified portfolio of 
securities, obviously a norm that requires the value of a particular as­
set class such as equity shares to be maximized is bound to fail. This 
leaves the question of how the efficient corporate law norm should be 
formulated. 
The history of corporate law offers an attractive possibility. Until 
well into this century, lawyers and judges69 conceived of the corporate 
fiduciary duty as running to "the corporation" itself rather than pri­
marily or exclusively to the shareholders.70 These earlier commenta-
69. Chancellor Allen, however, seems to be hinting at this idea in the language he uses 
in Credit Lyonnais: 
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is 
not merely the agent of the residual risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enter­
prise. . . . [T]he board [of directors] . . .  had an obligation to the community of interest that 
sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maxi­
mize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity. 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. Civ.A.12150, 
1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (emphasis added) reprinted in 17 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1099, 1155, 1157 (1992). 
70. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 138 (1972) (holding that directors have a 
fiduciary duty to promote the interests of the corporation); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 2 A.2d 225 
(Del. Ch. 1938), affd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939) (holding that directors are charged with an un­
yielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders); HENRY WINTHROP 
BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 122a (1927) (stating that directors and 
other officers of a corporation have a fiduciary relation toward the corporation); 1 R. 
FRANKLIN BALOITI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.10, at 4-233 (2d ed. 1997) ("Directors owe a duty of 
loyalty to the corporation and its stockholders . . . . "); 3 BETH A. BUDAY & BAIL A. 
O'GRADNEY, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 837.50, 
at 181 (rev. vol. 1994) (stating that directors must act for the benefit of the corporation and 
the shareholders); 11 SIMON M. LORNE, ACQUISI1TIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED 
AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS § lA.02[1](6] (1999) (stating that the beneficiary of the 
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tors did not have modem financial theory in mind. Nor did their con­
ception of the fiduciary duty as being owed to the corporate entity 
arise from any solicitude toward claimants other than shareholders. 
Nevertheless, corporate legal history offers a convenient device for 
conceptualizing the norm that emerges from hypothetical bargain 
analysis. 
Hypothetical bargain analysis suggests rational shareholders would 
prefer a norm that would have managers maximize the value of an ab­
straction, namely the sum of the values of the various components of 
rationally diversified portfolios. This abstraction is mathematically 
simple, but it is abstract nonetheless. In trying to embody such an ab­
stract norm in legal rules, one must tum to an abstract entity that can 
stand as the object of the duty. It cannot be efficient to make the 
holders of one asset class the sole beneficiaries of a maximization 
duty, unless it is always efficient to maximize the value of that class of 
assets, or at least unless exceptions to such a rule could be clearly de­
fined. As this is not the case, the corporate norm must be formulated 
in some other way. The natural alternative is to think of the duty as 
being owed to the corporation itself. 
As historians of corporate law know, early twentieth-century cor­
porate law theorists devoted astonishing energy to developing the the­
ory of the corporate entity or personality.71 Much of this work will 
strike the contemporary reader as obscure and metaphysical. The 
heavy influence of idealist philosophy accounts for some of this obscu­
rity.72 Economists will naturally find old idealist conceptions of the 
fiduciary duty is unclear, however three choices exist: the corporate entity itself, the share­
holders generally, or the minority shareholders); 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACITCE 2d § 47:27, at 47-71 {1997) ("[O]fficers of corporations, 
are fiduciaries as to corporate stockholders as well as to the corporation itself . . . .  "); 18B 
AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS § 1689, at 541 (1985) (stating that "it is well established that 
[directors] occupy a fiduciary, or more exactly a quasi-fiduciary, relation to the corporation 
and its stockholders"). 
71. See W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 L.Q. REV. 
365 (1905); George F. Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory, 17 
COLUM. L. REV. 128 (1917); George F. Deiser, The Juristic Person (pts. 1-3), 57 U. PA. L. 
REV. 131, 216, 300 (1908-1909); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal 
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); W.M. Geldart, Legal Personality, 27 L.Q. REV. 90 
(1911 ); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 217 (1985); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. 
L. REV. 404 (1916); Elvin R. Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 
MICH. L. REV. 597, 599-600 (1936); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality (pts. 1 & 
2), 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 347 (1910-1911); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the 
Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987); Max Radin, The 
Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932); Bryant Smith, 
Legal Personality, 37 YALE LJ. 283 (1928); Paul Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 CO LUM. 
L. REV. 594 (1924); Martin Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons, 54 L.Q. REV. 494 (1938). 
72 See 0. GIERKE, POLmCAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (F. w. Maitland 
trans., 1st ed. 1922); FREDERICK RALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY 49-72 {1930); H.J. 
LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 250-91 (1921); F.W. Maitland, Moral Person­
ality and Legal Personality, in 3 THE COLLECTED PAPERS 304, 315 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911). 
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corporation off-putting,73 but the idealist taint on the idea of the cor­
porate entity is just a contingency of the history of ideas. One need 
not think of the corporate entity in ways empirically oriented utilitari­
ans are apt to find ridiculous, such as its having some difficult-to­
define quality of personhood. To do important work, the corporation 
need not have an ontological status of the sort idealist philosophers or 
their intellectual heirs are wont to ascribe to collective entities of vari­
ous sorts, such as states and social classes. 
Rather, one can think of the corporation in the same way utilitari­
ans typically think of collective entities in their usual analyses of policy 
questions. Many legal economists evaluating policy choices will re­
gard as normatively preferable the choice that is Kaldor-Hicks supe­
rior to other options.74 One state of the world is Kaldor-Hicks supe­
rior to another if moving to that state would generate gains that could 
more than compensate losses from the move.75 As a kind of shorthand 
for this result, the legal economist may say "society" is better off for 
the making of a Kaldor-Hicks superior move. What she means, how­
ever, is only that the sum of individual utilities is greater in the Kal­
dor-Hicks superior world than in its alternative. She is not claiming 
some peculiar ontological status for society, and then claiming "it" is 
somehow better off. Economists are rarely accused of "reification" 
because they refer to "society."76 Addition is not reification. 
Yet using "society" in this sense is still normatively useful. Con­
sider how one would formulate a duty one might wish to put on poli­
cymakers to make the efficient choice.77 One could not formulate that 
duty as O\ving to one class of individuals more than to another, if effi­
ciency were the goal. If one wanted policymakers to be duty bound to 
choose efficiently, one would find useful some abstract noun such as 
"society" to stand in as the object of the duty to maximize the sum of 
individual utilities. In fact, it is commonplace in utilitarian thinking to 
use abstract collective entities to serve as shorthand for the sum of in-
The very embodiment of reification, of course, is G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY 
OF SPIRIT (Arnold V. Miller trans., 5th ed. l'f'77). 
73. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 12; Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 863 
n.22. 
74. See POSNER, supra note 61, at 13; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
JUSTICE 48-115 (1981 ). 
75. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND Tiffi LAW 98 (1988); POSNER, 
supra note 61, at 3-26; Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interper­
sonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550-51 (1939). 
76. Perhaps "rarely" is an exaggeration. For criticisms of reification in various contexts, 
see Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1565, 1578-79 (1993) (reification of "corporation"); Charles A. Reich, The Individual 
Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1441 (1991) (of "society"); and Steven L. Winter, The Meaning 
of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 334 (1992) (of "state"). 
77. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (1963). 
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dividual interests. To say "society" corresponds to everybody seems 
inaccurate, since utility maximization, or more correctly wealth maxi­
mization, might require advancing one person's interest ahead of an­
other's. In fact, "society" used this way corresponds more nearly to an 
abstract quantity, the sum of the respective utilities or wealth of indi­
viduals. 
The corporation can be thought of this way as well. The corporate 
entity thought of this way has an economic meaning if we conceive of 
it simply as shorthand for the sum of the values of all the various vol­
untary arrangements that make it up. To say that a manager owes a 
duty to "the corporation" to maximize the value of the corporation is 
simply one way of stating a gap-filling principle that applies to all of 
the contracts that make up the corporation. It is no more mysterious 
to say this than it is to say that a policymaker has a duty to do the 
thing that will make "society" best off, where society is understood to 
mean the sum of the interests of individuals who make up society. 
Given its somewhat lurid historical associations with idealist phi­
losophy, it is understandable that empirically oriented legal econo­
mists view the corporate "entity" with suspicion.78 There certainly 
have been those who have reified the corporation.79 My proposed 
conception of the corporate entity, however, is economically meaning­
ful and entails no disreputable ontological commitments. A reformu­
lated duty to maximize the value of the corporation involves no reifi­
cation. It is merely a shorthand way of expressing a duty to maximize 
the sum of the value of the various financial claims on the corporation, 
which, to be ontologically fastidious, are only indirect claims on other 
participants in the firm's enterprise. 
D. "Other Constituencies" of the Corporation 
Corporate law scholars have devoted much attention in the last 
several years to the question of what duties, if any, managers have to 
constituencies of the corporation other than shareholders. The reason 
for this is largely historical. Corporate-control market activity in the 
1980s and early 1990s led to changes of control of many American 
firms. One of the main motives for many of these transactions was to 
reallocate firm resources to more efficient uses, a project that involved 
terminating workers and closing facilities that could no longer be used 
profitably. Management threatened by control transactions and 
workers and other interests in communities where plants might be 
closed thus had a common interest in getting state legislatures to enact 
78. For denunciations of reification, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 11-
12; Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1, 67 (1995); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 311. 
79. See supra notes 71-72. 
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antitakeover legislation. A prominent feature of state antitakeover 
legislation was provisions that enable firm managers to take into ac­
count the interest of constituencies of the corporation such as workers, 
creditors, and local communities in deciding whether to oppose a hos­
tile takeover. Academic commentators tended to polarize in their 
public-policy evaluations of these statutes. 
This Article, however, bears only indirectly on this debate. This is 
because finance theory presently has little to add to the weighing of 
the interests of, say, production line workers against those of financial 
claimants against the corporation. There are compelling theoretical 
reasons arising directly from modem finance theory for treating pro­
viders of capital to the firm as being diversified in a certain way. This 
Article stresses that in light of modem finance theory it is as incorrect 
to treat shareholders and bondholders as separate opposing interests 
for purposes of determining default rules as it would be to assume 
shareholders are not diversified. Any model that proposes to fill gaps 
in the contracts of providers of capital to the firm should take the con­
sequences of modem finance theory seriously into account. 
This does not mean, however, that with no additional theoretical 
warrant, we can somehow extend the analysis to all providers of inputs 
to the firm. In some very general sense, one who uses efficiency as a 
normative guide should ask, does a permissive regime for corporate 
control transactions, for example, hurt some participants in corporate 
enterprises more than it helps others?80 Some commentators have ex­
amined Pareto-efficient rules under which losers in corporate transac­
tions would be compensated by winners.81 These debates, however, 
are more ambitious than anything I attempt here. There is as yet no 
consensus about how to define legal duties among all constituencies of 
the corporation, particularly workers and other providers of human 
capital. This Article stresses, however, that the current prevailing po­
sition, that the shareholders are and ought to be the primary benefici­
aries of the fiduciary duty, is indefensible in light of standard financial 
theory, even now, before more difficult and perhaps intractable ques­
tions about the relations of financial and nonfinancial inputs to the 
firm have been entirely resolved. The difficulty of the latter, more 
global set of questions should not obscure what clarity may be brought 
to the duties owed to financial claimants on the corporation. Some fu­
ture theory may elegantly model and explain the firm and its relations 
to all the diverse financial and nonfinancial parties in its entire net­
work of contracts. We already have, however, in CAPM a powerful 
80. Jeffrey Macintosh, for example, organizes possible efficient forms of corporate fidu­
ciary duty into several categories, including Pareto-superior and Kaldor-Hicks efficient 
forms of the duty. See Macintosh, supra note 42, at 429-30. My proposal would presumably 
fall into the Kaldor-Hicks category. But cf. supra note 59 (giving an example where Kaldor­
Hicks efficiency may be an inappropriate norm). 
81. See Macintosh, supra note 42, at 435-40. 
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theory about rational financial behavior. Shareholder value maximi­
zation is not a plausible candidate for fiduciary duty under that theory. 
III. THE INDIFFERENCE OF PUBLIC CORPORATION LAW TO 
DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES 
Conceiving of the corporate law norm as maximizing the value of 
the corporation has some interesting consequences. The fiduciary 
gap-filling rule that flows from hypothetical bargain analysis mandates 
maximization of firm value, but the rule is indifferent among equally 
efficient distributions among different asset classes of public corpora­
tions.82 When one considers the permissive attitude corporate law 
takes in the public corporation context toward gap-filling decisions 
with distributional consequences, this formulation of fiduciary duty 
seems descriptive of, or at least consistent with, some actual practice. 
I briefly consider below three areas where this thesis is borne out: 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs), targeted share repurchases, and recapitali­
zations affecting preferred stock. The doctrines that produce the judi­
cial results found in these areas differ, but one could regard the princi­
ple as the same. Unless express terms of the corporate contract 
provide otherwise, managers may take steps to maximize firm value 
regardless of the horizontal or distributional effects on particular as­
sets classes. 
A. LB Os, Bondholders, and Fiduciary Duties 
In the late 1980s, the RJR/Nabisco transaction and other large 
LBOs generated considerable controversy. One debated feature of 
LBOs was the losses they could cause to the market value of bonds 
outstanding when acquirers bought the target firm. Acquirers often 
financed LBOs partly through the issuance of new debt by the target 
firm. Even if existing debt of the target was senior to the new debt, 
the market value of the old debt could fall, partly because in practice 
absolute priority is usually not strictly observed in bankruptcy.83 Thus 
82. The efficient gap-filling rule mandates that the size of the corporate pie be maxi­
mized but does not mandate any particular division of the pie among various classes of in­
vestors in the corporation. 
83. See John D. Ayers, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963 
(1989); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours 
of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHl:. L. REV. 738 (1988); Carliss Y. Baldwin & Scott P. 
Mason, The Resolution of Claims in Financial Distress: The Case of Massey Ferguson, 38 J, 
FIN. 505 (1983); Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute 
Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457, 1468 (1990); Julian R. Franks & 
Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J, FIN. 747 
(1989); Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Prior­
ity and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009 (1987); Alan Schwartz, A Contract 
Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1836 {1998); David A. Skeel, 
The Uncertain State of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy's Contribution Rule Doctrine After 
Ahlers, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 {1989); Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Absolllle Priority, 
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the new debt, even though junior, could effectively dilute the claims of 
senior bondholders. 
This effect was particularly stark in the RJR/Nabisco deal, where 
bondholders reportedly lost approximately $40 million in market 
value from the pretransaction value of their bonds.84 Bondholders of 
RJR/Nabisco sued their issuer, claiming that by approving the LBO, 
the target board had violated a fiduciary or similar duty that they 
owed bondholders.85 While bondholders lost this case, they won the 
support of some academic commentators. David Millon, for example, 
has argued that bondholders in cases like RJR/Nabisco ought to bene­
fit from fiduciary protection. Managers should be regarded, he argues, 
as having a duty to treat shareholders and bondholders according to a 
rule of Pareto-optimality.86 That is, managers should not be able to 
make an investment decision, such as to approve an LBO, even if it 
would make shareholders better off, if it would make bondholders 
worse off. 
To test Millon's claim, it might seem we should ask whether 
Pareto-optimality is the rule to which hypothetical shareholders and 
bondholders would agree as a gap-filling principle for the corporate 
contract.87 As I noted above, the main response of economic analysts 
to arguments of Millon and other bondholder advocates has been to 
insist that bondholders have in effect contracted out of any fiduciary 
protection in the hypothetical bargain.88 In this view, bondholders 
and the Pricing of Risky Debt Claims, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 239 (1977); Lawrence A. Weiss, The 
Bankruptcy Code and Violations of Absolute Priority, 4 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 71 (1991). 
84. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989); BRYAN BURROWS & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF 
RJR NABISCO (1990); Bratton, supra note 50; Nancy W. Graml, Bondholder Rights in Lev­
eraged Buyouts in the Aftermath a/Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 29 
AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (1991); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Deal­
ing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993); Kahan & Klausner, Anti­
takeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 50, at 932 n.1; Kahan & Klausner, The Qualified 
Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, supra note 50; Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a 
Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1996); F. John Stark III et 
al., "Marriott Risk": A New Model Covenant to Restrict Transfers of Wealth from Bondhold­
ers to Stockholders, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 503; Kenneth N. Gilpin, Bid for RJR Na­
bisco Jolts Bonds, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1988, at D11; Wayne E. Green & Sonja Steptoe, 
Metropolitan Life Joins Backlash Against Leveraged Buy-Outs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1 8, 1 988, 
at Cl; Glenn Ruffenach & Randall Smith, RJR Nabisco Gets Major Jolt in Debt Ratings, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1990, at A3; Ames Stemgold, Koh/berg Leads Latest Nabisco Bids, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1988, at Dl. 
85. See Metropolitan Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1508. 
86. See Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 4, at 267-68. 
87. See Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate 
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 761 (1978); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control 
Transactions, supra note 61, at 702; McDaniel, supra note 50, at 447; Morey W. McDaniel, 
Bondholders And Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 246 (1988). 
88. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 52; Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 
1443; Macey, supra note 7, at 36-39; Kenneth Lehn, The Lessons of Marriott, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 11, 1993, at A14. 
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have agreed to shareholder value maximization as the gap-filling rule, 
or contracts with bondholders are assumed to be effectively gapless. 
In either event, bondholders do not enjoy fiduciary protection. This 
response, however, is weak. The argument that bond contracts need 
no gap filling, which I criticize above, seems especially disingenuous in 
the LBO context, when one considers the surprise with which 
bondholders and bond markets greeted the financial innovations 
spawned by LBOs.89 One could also argue that the emergence of 
event risk covenants,90 devices intended to protect existing 
bondholders from losses caused by LBOs, is evidence that creditors 
had not anticipated bond losses by LBOs.91 If one grants that bond 
contracts do require a gap-filling principle, then the question of what it 
should be remains. 
If one envisions the appropriate gap-filling principle as emerging 
from a hypothetical contract negotiation between bondholders and 
shareholders, then Millon's proposal might seem correct. Bondhold­
ers, one might argue, would have little reason to agree to anything less 
than Pareto-optimality, since such a rule would not allow managers to 
favor shareholders at their expense. Yet proponents of shareholder 
wealth maximization might equally well contest this point. They might 
argue that bondholders would agree to a rule that shareholder value 
be maximized, subject only to the express constraints in bond con­
tracts. Bondholders would prefer to have no open-ended protection, 
they could argue, because the cost of this protection to them in terms 
of lower interest rates would be too high.92 
89. See Christopher Farrell, Bondholders Are Mad as Hell - and They're Not Going to 
Take It Anymore, Bus. WK., Feb. 6, 1989, at 82; Christopher Farrell, Takeovers and Buyouts 
Clobber Blue-Chip Bondholders New Debt to Finance-or Fend Off-Corporate Raiding 
Sends Prices Tumbling, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985, at 113; Wayne E. Green & Sonja Steptoe, 
Metropolitan Life Joins Backlash Against Leveraged Buy-Outs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1988, 
at Cl; Gary Hector, The Bondholders' Cold New World. (Securities Devalued Because of 
Leveraged Buyouts and Other Debt-Riddled Deals), FORTUNE, Feb. 27, 1989, at 83; James E. 
Lebherz, Taking a Look Back at the Year in Fixed-Income Securities, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 
1989, at H6; Paul Richter, The Deal That Burst the Bubble for KKR Buyouts: The Bank­
ruptcy Filing of Hillsborough Holdings, Formerly Jim Walter Corp., Was the End of an Era 
for an Investment Giant Of The '80s, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1990, at Dl; Linda Sandler, Sollth­
land's Junk Bonds Face Trouble, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1989, at C3; Linda Sandler, "Predators 
Ball" Belles Will Be Buy-Out Bonds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1989, at C3. 
90. See Stark et al., supra note 84, at 566-81 (describing development of event risk cove­
nants). 
91. See Bratton, supra note 50, at 156; Gram!, supra note 84, at 34-35; Stark et al., supra 
note 844, at 509; Peter D.W. Heiberling, Event Risk Provisions Protect Bondholders Against 
Takeovers, 22 NAT'L LJ., June 5, 1989, at 22; Daniel Hertzberg, Poison Piii Bonds Are Lat· 
est Weapon in Companies' Anti-Takeover Strategy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1986, at AS; Larry 
Light, Investors Are Developing a Taste for This Poison, Bus. WK., July 10, 1989, at 78. 
92. See Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 42 at 211-12; Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover 
Provisions in Bonds, supra note 50, at 937-38; Kahan & Klausner, The Qualified Case 
Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, supra note 50; Macey, supra note 7, at 36; Andrew J. 
Nussbaum, Like Money in The Bank? An Economic Analysis of Fiduciary Duties to Protect 
the S&L Deposit Insurance Fund, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 355, 365-66 (1992); Schwarcz, supra 
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The important thing to notice about this disagreement between 
bondholder advocates and proponents of shareholder value maximiza­
tion is its intractability. They disagree essentially over what prefer­
ences should be ascribed to bondholders. The mere ascription of 
preferences, however, is a notoriously weak foundation for economic 
explanation. Consider first the claim of proponents of shareholder 
value maximization. Their argument against any duty to bondholders 
rests on the claiJn that bondholders and shareholders would agree ex 
ante to terms that put the risk of loss from financial innovation on 
bondholders, because shareholders would demand a price higher for 
protection from such loss than bondholders would be willing to pay. 
This argument amounts to no more than an assertion about what 
prices, as a result of underlying preferences, would be. We cannot, 
however, know what relative preferences and therefore prices will be 
between bondholders and shareholders respecting financial innovation 
risk by looking at any deals shareholders and bondholders have actu­
ally struck. In practice, bondholders cannot contract into fiduciary or 
similar protection as a gap-filling rule that is superior to what share­
holders get, whether or not they wanted to do so. Bondholders could 
not get a contractual term that says, "for all matters not addressed in 
this contract, the interests of bondholders are to be treated by corpo­
rate directors as equal to (or superior to) those of common sharehold­
ers." As interpreted by modern courts and academic commentators, 
such a provision would violate managers' fiduciary duty to sharehold­
ers.93 If bondholders and shareholders were so free, then their failure 
to agree on such benefits for bondholders might be evidence that from 
their perspective the costs of this protection would outweigh the bene­
fits. But as long as the governing rule is that shareholders benefit ex­
clusively from a fiduciary duty and bondholders can get only express 
contractual protections, a contract term purporting to provide bond­
holders with something like gap-filling fiduciary protection would be 
unenforceable. Nothing consequently can be inferred from the pres­
ent allocation of risks, not even underlying preferences. 
Critics of shareholder value maximization, however, are in an 
equally untenable position. Millon imagines, in effect, a hypothetical 
bargain between bondholders and shareholders, resulting in a Pareto­
optimality rule protecting bondholders; however, this result is based, 
as much as the argument above is based, on ungrounded assumptions 
about what bondholders would prefer. It simply assumes bondholders 
would value this protection by more than shareholders would charge 
for it. Millon on one side, and Easterbrook and Fischel on the other, 
are arguing over what is inside a black box. 
Yet the exercise is useful because it makes one realize that once 
note 84, at 681; Stark et al., supra note 84, at 579. 
93. See supra notes 3, 19, and 23. 
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one has imaginatively put bondholders and shareholders across the ta­
ble to negotiate gap-filling rules, there is no determinate outcome, be 
it Pareto-optimality, or shareholder wealth maximization, or anything 
else (unless one begs the question by asserting that the parties' prefer­
ences will lead to one's preferred result). Framed as a hypothetical 
contract between shareholders and bondholders, the problem of set­
tling on a gap-filling rule is intractable. This is a clue that the problem 
is incorrectly formulated. As I have argued in this Article, however, 
there is a way out. That way is to take the gap-filling rule as the result 
not of a hypothetical bargain among shareholders and bondholders 
(and other layers of the corporate capital structure), but as the result 
of a hypothetical bargain among the rational investors in the firm. 
They would settle on the maximization of firm value as the filler of 
gaps in the corporate contract. Cast this way, the problem is anything 
but intractable. 
We can apply this gap-filling principle to cases in which 
bondholders have invoked a purported fiduciary duty owed to them. 
In Metropolitan and other cases,94 the courts ruled that bondholders 
could not recover losses they suffered as a result of leveraged 
transactions that did not violate express contract terms. This result 
would be consistent with the rule rational investors would select as a 
gap-filling rule, but only if the transaction in question increased the 
value of stock by more than it decreased the value of the bonds. 
There is some evidence that LBOs by and large did have this firm­
value-increasing effect.95 Rationally diversified investors would 
approve transactions that increased firm value and would be 
indifferent toward distributional issues, for example the losses to 
bondholders. This principle would, of course, only be a gap-filling 
rule. If firms would be worth more with stronger or weaker 
bondholder protections than those implicit in this gap-filling rule, they 
94. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. E-II Holdings, Inc., 926 F.2d 636, 643-
44 (7th Cir. 1991); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane); 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 723 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Simons 
v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988); Pittelman v. Pearce, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359 (Ct. App. 
1992); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986); Hazzard v. Chase Nat'! Bank, 
287 N.Y.S. 541, 566-67 Sup. Ct. (1936), aff d mem., 14 N.Y.S.2d 147 (App. Div. 1939), aff d 
mem., 26 N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1940). 
95. See Paul Asquith & Thierry A. Wizman, Event Risk, Covenants, and Bondholder 
Returns in Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating 
Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 818-19 (1987); 
Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private 
Transactions, 44 J. FIN. 771 (1989); Laurentius Marais et al., Wealth Effects of Going Private 
for Senior Securities, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 155 (1989); Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, 
Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 V AND. L. REV. 
207 (1988); Krishna G. Palepu, Consequences of Leveraged Buyollts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 247 
(1990). 
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should be able to provide for that by contract. Absent such express 
provisions, however, if an LBO were to decrease total firm value by 
reducing the value of bonds by more than it increased the value of 
stock, a court applying the fiduciary duty principle I propose should 
rule that the transaction breached a fiduciary duty that the managers 
owed not to bondholders, but to the target corporation.96 
Cases such as Metropolitan would thus probably come out the 
same way under the neotraditional version of the fiduciary duty I pro­
pose as they did under the analysis courts actually employed. This 
convergence may constitute some weak support for my view, in the 
sense that it is consistent with these judicial results. LBO cases might 
also be taken as support for the general view that courts applying fidu­
ciary duty analysis to public corporations accord little weight to purely 
distributional concerns in filling gaps in the public corporate contract. 
This emphasis on maximizing firm value is consistent with the neotra­
ditional approach. 
B. Targeted Share Repurchases and Auctions - Unocal and Revlon 
In targeted share repurchases ("TSRs"), corporations buy back 
stock from some shareholders but not others. TSRs typically involve 
the purchase of a large block of shares from a potential acquirer of the 
company at a significant premium over their markef value and their 
purchase price.97 Though stigmatized as "greenmail," evidence sug­
gests that TSRs may actually increase, on average, the total value of 
companies that engage in them.98 Yet TSRs probably also distribute 
gains disproportionately from some shareholders to others. 
TSRs typically involve shares of public corporations. They repre­
sent a relatively clear instance in which shareholders are not treated 
with horizontal equality but in which the transaction in question in-
96. See Schwarcz, supra note 84, at 685-86. 
97. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 1377 (1986); Michael Bradley & L. Macdonald Wakeman, The Wealth Effects of 
Targeted Share Repurchases, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 301, 306-07 (1983); Larry Y. Dann, Common 
Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders, 9 J. FIN. 
ECON. 113 (1981); Larry Y. Dann & Harry DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Ne­
gotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 285-
88 (1983). < 
98. See Bradley & Wakeman, supra note 97, at 312-13; William J. Carney, Controlling 
Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 
1988 WIS. L. REV. 385, 398; Dann & DeAngelo, supra note 97, at 295; Clifford G. Holder­
ness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Investors, 
14 J. FIN. ECON. 555 (1985); Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: 
A Contractual Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185, 208-09 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. 
McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985); Wayne 
H. Mikkelson & Richard S. Ruback, Targeted Share Repurchases and Common Stock Re­
turns, 22 RAND J. ECON. 544 (1991); A. Schliefer & R.W. Vishny, Greenmail, White Knights, 
and Shareholders Interest, 17 RAND J. ECON. 293 (1986). 
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creases the total value of all financial claims on the company. Pennis­
sive treatment of TSRs by courts is consistent with the idea that the 
corporate law norm mandates maximization of firm value but is rela­
tively indifferent to distributional consequences even within a single 
class of claimants, unless distributions violate express corporate con­
tractual terms. 
TSRs are restricted, however, when there is substantial reason to 
doubt that their use will maximize firm value. Unocal involved a TSR 
formulated to protect against a tender offer hostile to the firm's in­
cumbent management.99 The Delaware court imposed the restrictions 
of what became known as the Unocal standard.100 This standard is 
sometimes construed as pennitting TSRs calculated to increase firm 
value, by fending off low bids, for example, but not those merely in­
tended to entrench management. 
The landmark Revlon case,101 often cited as support for 
shareholder primacy, deserves special attention. It made explicit a 
fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the winning bid in the context 
of a firm sale.102 In Revlon, management's attempted friendly deal 
with the white knight Forstmann-Little stopped the auction of the firm 
in exchange for the white knight's supporting the price of notes whose 
poison-pill-like covenants had to be removed for the friendly deal to 
go forward. The white knight's promise to support note prices was 
apparently calculated to reduce the exposure of target directors to 
personal liability from suits by disaffected note holders.103 Revlon 
could be taken to stand for the proposition that a bidder could do 
nothing to accommodate vulnerable note holders or other claimants, if 
it meant shareholders would get one penny less.104 
This is, however, exactly the sort of shareholder primacy an effi­
cient corporate law norm should eschew. Under my theory, Revlon 
management should have been allowed to accept, after a firm-value­
maximizing auction, a bid that offered the most in total value for the 
firm, even if it offered less than another bid for stock. Would one 
really want courts to compel Revlon management to accept, with the 
company on the auction block, a lower bid, just because it offered 
99. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
100. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Life and Adventures of 
Unocal-Part I: Moore the Marrier, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 85 (1998); Janet E. Kerr, Delaware 
Goes Shopping for a "New" Interpretation of the Revlon Standard: The Effect of the QVC 
Decision on Strategic Mergers, 58 ALB. L. REV. 609, 616-20 (1995). 
101. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
102. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
103. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. 
104. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (chastising Revlon management for accepting buyout 
terms that benefited subordinated note holders at the expense of shareholders). 
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more per share than another bid that offered to buy both Revlon stock 
and notes, and offered more in total for securities of the company? To 
insist on such a result would make a fetish of shareholder value maxi­
mization. The neotraditional approach I propose is entirely consistent 
with a rational version of the Revlon duty that would require manag­
ers, when auctioning off the company, to sell it to the highest bidder. 
My approach merely insists that the size of the bid be measured by the 
sum of amounts offered for all of the target's securities, not merely its 
common stock. In any event, it seems unlikely that the sum Forstman­
Little actually offered for Revlon notes, even if taken into account, 
would have made its bid the highest. If, however, it would have, then 
Revlon management would have acted consistently with their fiduci­
ary duty, in my view, in selling Revlon to Forstman-Little. Indeed, 
one can imagine that in a case like Revlon, a white knight and incum­
bent management might want to budget part of the total expense of 
acquiring control of the target firm toward relief of noteholders or 
other financial claimants who would otherwise suffer losses from the 
transaction and therefore oppose it. It would be arbitrary to refuse to 
count these payments as part of the value the bidder was offering to 
pay for the target firm. 
C. Recapitalizations Affecting Preferred Stock 
Although not residual claimants, preferred stockholders are equity 
claimants on their firm and, traditionally, beneficiaries of a fiduciary 
duty.105 Yet a series of celebrated corporate law cases shows the noto­
rious indifference of corporate law toward managerial decisions that 
allocate corporate value away from preferred stockholders and toward 
.common stockholders.106 In these recapitalizations, accumulated pre­
ferred dividends were extinguished and replaced with newly issued 
common or preferred stock. As a first approximation, this sort of re-
105. See Great W. Producers Co-op. v. Great W. United Corp., 613 P.2d 873, 875 (Colo. 
1980); Kirschner Bros. Oil v. Natomas Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 784, 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); 
Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 569 P.2d 875, 881 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1977); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986); Susan A. Barrett, 
Fiduciary Duties and Stock Warrants: A Fine Distinction Between Shareholder Rights and 
Contract Rights, 21 STETSON L. REV. 253, 260 (1991); Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 
supra note 45, at 651; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (and 
Why We Should Care About It), 51 Bus. LAW. 443, 454 (1996); Robert B. Robbins & Barton 
Clark, The Board's Fiduciary Duty to Preferred Stockholders, 7 INSIGHTS, No. 11, at 18, 21-
22 (1993). 
106. See Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), aff d, 146 
F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969); Western 
Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. 1949); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 
341 (Mich. 1949); Iowa ex rel Weede v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1948); Johnson v. 
Fuller, 121 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1941); Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch. 
1944), aff d, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944); Buckley v. Cuban American Sugar Co., 19 A.2d 820 
(N.J. Ch. 1940); HB Korenvaes lnvs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 748 (1993) 
Johnson v. Lamprecht, 15 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 1938). 
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capitalization should have, under the Miller-Modigliani irrelevance 
theorem, only distributional consequences and leave the total value of 
the firm unaffected.107 
Courts addressed these cases with contract-style analysis. They 
read the corporate contract as containing an implicit term that the 
chartering authority, the state legislature, could change the rules by 
passing merger statutes that allowed the sort of recapitalization statute 
in question to proceed.108 Another slightly narrower and perhaps 
preferable interpretation of these cases would be to take courts as 
filling gaps in corporate contracts. The contracts were silent on the 
rights and duties of various classes of equity claimants in the face of 
legal innovation. The courts might be seen as applying a hypothetical 
contract term that rational investors proportionally invested in com­
mon and preferred stock would prefer, namely that transactions that 
might increase the value of the firm, even while distributing gains from 
one equity class to another, be permitted, unless specifically prohib­
ited by other terms in the corporate contract. If this is the correct gap­
filling principle, the courts' seemingly cold treatment of preferred 
stockholders is unobjectionable. The decisions are consistent with a 
default rule to which rational investors would agree ex ante. 
D. Close Corporations 
As D. Gordon Smith recently argued, the history of the share­
holder primacy doctrine bears out the idea that it historically dealt 
mainly with horizontal equity among shareholders in the context of 
the close, not public, corporation.109 The famous Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co.110 case, often cited as a landmark statement of the shareholder 
primacy norm,111 far from "enunciating a meta-principle of corporate 
law," as Smith points out, "was merely deciding a dispute between 
majority and minority shareholders in a closely held corporation in the 
same way courts had decided such disputes for nearly a century."112 
As Smith explains, the shareholder primacy norm grew out of the 
older idea that the corporation was a trust for those interested in it, 
namely shareholders. Controlling shareholders had a fiduciary duty to 
107. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART c. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
F!NANCE 376 (4th ed. 1991). 
108. See Bove, 249 A.2d at 97-98 (stating that "the stockholder's contractual rights have 
been altered, but in each instance the alterations are permitted by the stockholder's contract 
into which the law reads the reserved power to amend or repeal. That power is a part of the 
charter or articles of association of every Rhode Island corporation"). 
109. See Smith, supra note 3, at 322-23. 
110. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
111. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1423-24. 
112. Smith, supra note 3, at 320. 
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all shareholders. This idea matured into the modem doctrine of mi­
nority oppression. The idea behind the doctrine lingered on in 
phrases in the case law, such as the oft-quoted language of Ford and of 
Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co. : " [T]he ultimate object of every ordinary 
trading corporation is the pecuniary gain of its stockholders."113 
For purposes of the neotraditional formulation of the corporate 
norm, however, corporations with publicly traded securities and 
closely held corporations should be clearly distinguished. This is be­
cause the logic of the neotraditional formulation is driven by the 
choices of rational investors in the capital markets. While there is a 
strong warrant for treating diversified investors as complying with the 
full mandate of CAPM, treating part owners of close corporations, 
who are more akin to partners in an enterprise, in the same way would 
not be justifiable. This does not mean that analysts would not profit 
from taking a contractual approach to understanding the law of close 
corporations, as some scholars have done.114 It merely means that the 
conclusions that follow from the diversification of rational CAPM in­
vestors do not apply directly to the close corporation context. 
IV. THE CORPORATE LAW NORM AND "DERIVATIVE REALITY" 
I have argued that the corporate law norm of "maximizing 
shareholder value" is inefficient. I began with the problem of Credit 
Lyonnais and used the omnipresence of the "vicinity of insolvency"115 
to suggest the depth of the problem. The neotraditional corporate law 
norm, I argue, is the way out of this conundrum: rational investors 
would choose in a hypothetical bargain to maximize firm, not 
shareholder, value. 
One might argue that the difference between the shareholder value 
maximization and the neotraditional formulation of fiduciary duty is 
not that important. In most garden-variety firms, one might say, both 
norms would point managers in the right direction, and the practical 
problem will always be pushing managers the right way. Arguing 
about whether the fiduciary duty should require maximizing firm 
value, instead of shareholder value, one might say, is arguing about 
the details of a utopia no one will ever actually see. This criticism, 
however, would be shortsighted, as I argue below. 
Shifting to the neotraditional norm would make a significant dif­
ference to corporate law practice and judicial opinions but, under cur­
rent conditions, not a radical one. I suggested above two immediate 
implications of my proposal. First, under the neotraditional formula-
113. 53 N.W. 218, 223 (Mich. 1892); see also Smith, supra note 3, at 314 (relating Miner 
to the nineteenth century shift to protection of minority shareholders). 
114. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 228-52. 
115. See supra Section I.A.2. 
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tion of the fiduciary duty, the Revlon duty would have to change: tar­
get managers should be able to accept a friendly bid, if that bid totaled 
more than another bid that offered more for the target's common 
stock.116 Second, transactions that reduced the total value of the firm, 
even though they increased the value of the target's common stock, as 
a leveraged buyout could conceivably do, should be seen as violating 
managers' fiduciary duty to the corporation, unless the transaction was 
expressly permitted by the "corporate contract" - in the corporate 
articles or bond indentures, for example. Leveraged transactions that 
are inefficient in this way, I grant, would probably be extreme and un­
usual.117 
The most important difference that a shift would make, however, 
stems from the tendency of economic evolution to subject our legal in­
frastructure to stress, turning relatively harmless doctrinal incoheren­
cies into embarrassing errors. In the next few decades, it seems likely, 
as Professor Hu has argued, that financial innovation, in particular the 
development of various equity derivatives, will test current concep­
tions of fiduciary duty.118 It is already obvious that the shareholder 
value maximization norm will not be up to these tests. As capital 
markets grow more complete, the problems with the shareholder 
value maximization norm will be difficult to limit to merely academic 
discussions. 
A. Disaggregating Equity 
1. Residual Claims 
Financial products can be quite complicated,119 but for our pur­
poses the theoretical problems raised by equity derivatives can be de­
scribed simply and schematically. Modem financial theory explains 
that options are the building blocks of all financial instruments and 
provides precise models of how options are priced.120 "Financial engi-
116. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98. 
117. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
118. See sources cited supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
119. For general discussions of different derivatives, see Hu, supra note 15; Karol, supra 
note 17; Kleinbard, supra note 16; Joseph L. Motes III, A Primer on the Trade and Regula­
tion of Derivative Instruments, 49 SMU L. REV. 579 (1996); Barbara Donnelly Granito, 
Common Terms in the Derivatives Market, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1993, at A6; Cathy E. 
Minehan & Katerina Simons, Managing Risk in the '90s: What Should You Be Asking About 
Derivatives?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Sept. 19, 1995, at 3; Balvinder S. Sangha, Financial 
Derivatives: Applications and Policy Issues, Bus. ECON., Jan. 1. 1995, at 46. 
120. Options are the building blocks of more complex derivatives. See Frank Partnoy, 
Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 216 (1997); 
Kenneth A. Froot et al., A Framework for Risk Management, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 
1994, at 91, 99; Donald L. Horwitz, Derivatives, I: The Basics on Tenns and Risks, 5 Bus. L. 
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neers," who design new security products, can therefore disaggregate 
common stock into its component financial parts, including options. 
Equity can be disaggregated in different ways, but for our purposes we 
can imagine this process as being analogous to the slicing of a cake; 
but unlike the usual practice of cutting perpendicularly to the bottom 
of the cake, imagine slicing along a horizontal plane, parallel to the 
bottom of the cake. Slicing common stock horizontally, in this picture, 
divides it into different call-option-like claims that have different exer­
cise prices. I call this "horizontal" because these divisions are like the 
horizontal divisions between different layers of financing on the right 
side of the corporate balance sheet. These layers of conventional fi­
nancing are, after all, like call options that have increasingly high exer­
cise prices as one moves down the right side of the balance sheet 
(through horizontal layers) from senior debt to common stock. Thus 
the senior-most debt has an exercise price of zero. The first dollars of 
the firm's value must go to those who hold the senior-most claims. 
These claims are capped at the total amount due on the senior debt, 
and this line marks the beginning, or exercise price, of the next layer 
of firm financing. This layer in turn has a cap equal to the exercise 
price of the next layer, and so forth, until one reaches the junior-most 
claims on the firm. 
In a conventional capital structure, the bottommost layer would be 
common stock of the familiar sort. These are the residual claimants in 
whom the standard view of corporate law would vest control rights 
and the exclusive right to benefit from the fiduciary duty, because of 
their supposed incentives to maximize the value of the firm. What ad­
vances in financial technology make it possible to do, among other 
things, is to slice the distribution of risks and returns depicted on the 
conventional corporate balance sheet into thinner layers. To take one 
example, some investment bankers once proposed that firms sell "un­
bundled stock units."121 The proposed transaction would have divided 
up common stock into several components, including a security repre­
senting the expectation that firms would continue to pay dividends at 
historical rates, and also a call-option-like security representing a 
claim to appreciation of the firm's value above its current value. Of 
course, one would not have to stop there. One could disaggregate 
TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 38; Sangha, supra note 119, at 46. 
121. For the story of unbundled stock units, see, for example, Alan J. Berkeley & Jean 
E. Minarick, Disclosure and Developments in Financing Instruments and Techniques, 703 
PLl/CORP 335, 349 (1990); John D. Finnerty & Victor M. Borun, An Analysis of Unbundled 
Stock Units, 1 GLOBAL FIN. J. 47-69 (1989); Hu, supra note 15, at 1299; Raymond W. Wag­
ner, Unbundled Stock Units, 662 PLl/CORP 175 {1989); Report, Sixth Annual Review of De­
velopments in Business Financing, 45 Bus. LAW. 441, 446-49 (1989) (describing unbundled 
stock units); George Anders & Steve Swartz, Some Big Firms to Break up Stock into New 
Securities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1988, at Cl; Floyd Norris, Shearson's Financial Alchemy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1988, at Fl; and William E. Sheeline, Unbundled Stocks: How They 
Work, FORTUNE, Jan. 2, 1989, at 11. 
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common stock into any number of call-option-like claims, each class of 
which would give the holder a claim to the value of the firm at in­
creasingly larger amounts above its current value. These "horizontal" 
call option slices of the value of firm, being further and further "out of 
the money," would represent increasingly "residual" and increasingly 
leveraged claims on the value of the firm.122 
Using new financial products to disaggregate equity horizontally 
does not achieve anything fundamentally different from what finan­
ciers could do with more familiar tools. Simply by borrowing more 
money, for example, managers could make the firm more highly lev­
eraged, and this would, in effect, increase the exercise price of the call 
options we quaintly call the common stock. For lawyers thinking 
about fiduciary duty, what the new instruments can do, however, is to 
force one to confront doctrinal difficulties. Thus, for example, if man­
agers borrow for the first time, so that the firm goes from an all-equity 
capital structure to one in which debt equals equity, under the conven­
tional view this makes no difference to either the object or content of 
the fiduciary duty. Managers still owe common shareholders a duty to 
maximize the value of their shares. Yet if the firm sells financially 
equivalent call options (as firms increasingly do123), they owe pre­
sumably no such duty to the holders of those options, who are in a fi­
nancially equivalent position to holders of common stock in a lever­
aged firm. As firms begin to offer more and different slices of what 
would traditionally have been included in the common equity of a 
firm's capital structure, what can the standard view tell us about the 
object and content of the corporate fiduciary duty? Very little, I 
think, that is satisfying. 
One could begin with the principle Easterbrook and Fischel sug­
gest, that common shareholders benefit from the fiduciary duty be­
cause they are the residual claimants, and infer that those with the 
most residual claims should be the exclusive beneficiaries of the duty. 
This principle, however, is clearly unsatisfactory. Suppose a firm slices 
up its equity into very thin slices, including call-option-like claims that 
are very far out-of-the-money.124 Surely we do not want to place man-
122. See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 
413, 420-21 (1986). 
123. See, e.g., Interneuron Pharmaceuticals Announces Call Option Arrangements, Bus. 
WIRE, May 5, 1997; New Deals - IDEC Pharmaceutical Corp., BIOVENTURE VIEW, Oct. 1, 
1997; A Twist for Issuers and Buyers, the Detachable Call Option Debuts in $67 Million Las 
Vegas Deal, BOND BUYER, Apr. 9, 1992, at 5 (call options used in municipal finance). 
124. An option is "out-of-the-money" when its exercise price is greater than the current 
market value of the underlying security, such as stock. Thus an option to buy stock in 
Amazon.com at a price of $175 would be out-of-the-money if Amazon.com were currently 
trading at $150. Options that are out-of-the-money at their expiration or maturity date are 
worthless. No one would pay anything for the right to buy for $175 a stock selling on the 
market for only $150. The more the price of the underlying security is below the exercise 
price of the option, the more the option is out-of-the-money. 
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agers under a duty to maximize the value of those claims, irrespective 
of the effects those actions would have on the value of other slices of 
the value of the firm. The incentives of holders of far-out-of-the­
money call options are equivalent to those of shareholders of very 
highly leveraged firms. They would both have managers choose risky 
but inefficient projects that would increase the value of their options, 
even if they would decrease the total value of the firm. It may seem 
reasonable to say that a highly leveraged firm has entered the "vicinity 
of insolvency," but this mysterious region becomes more magical still 
if we suppose the firm enters it as well by dividing up its equity into its 
financial component parts. It is hard to see how the solvency of the 
firm has changed by restructuring its equity, yet the troubling effect on 
the incentives of its most residual claimants is exactly the same as if 
the firm had leveraged itself to the hilt. 
Alternative arguments for the standard view are difficult to for­
mulate. If the most residual slices of equity are not those whose value 
should be maximized, then what should be maximized? In fact, there 
is no justification in finance theory for maximizing the value of any 
one horizontal slice of the value of the firm. If one does not include 
the interests of the most residual claim holders, for instance, in the 
calculus of fiduciary duty, managers will not have the correct incen­
tives to pursue projects that are quite risky but nevertheless efficient. 
If one includes only the residual slice, the incentives are the opposite, 
but potentially just as inefficient. 
The only "slice" of the value of the firm the maximization of which 
it would be efficient for managers to pursue as a matter of duty is a 
vertical slice, one that includes a proportional amount of every layer of 
the firm's capital structure. And this, as it happens, is precisely the 
slice that CAPM mandates - for completely independent reasons, 
that the rational investor should hold. This important convergence of 
efficient portfolio theory and the modeling of efficient corporate gov­
ernance and corporate norms has been unjustifiably neglected in con­
temporary discussions of corporate law, and obscured by the empha­
sis, dating back to Berle and Mean's profoundly premodern125 theories 
of finance, on the "shareholders." No version of the standard account, 
but only the neotraditional account of corporate fiduciary duty, yields 
efficient managerial incentives. 
Applying the options analysis to corporate capital structure, stock of a corporation is 
like a call option in the sense that stockholders can be imagined as having the option to buy 
the firm by paying off creditors and keeping any residual for themselves. If a company were 
so highly leveraged that if it were to liquidate, not all creditors could be paid off in full, and 
stockholders would get nothing, the "options" represented by common stock could be said 
to be out-of-the-money. 
125. See BERLE & PEDERSON, supra note 56. 
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2. Letter Stock Puzzles 
Another type of new equity product illustrates yet another 
conundrum-producing quality of the shareholder value maximization 
norm. It is now fairly common for large firms such as General Motors 
to issue equity claims not on the value of the whole corporation but on 
some part of the firm's business. GM pioneered the use of this "letter 
stock" - so called because the first of its kind, General Motors E 
stock, was tied to GM's Electronic Data Systems (EDS) division, 
which it purchased from H. Ross Perot. As Hu explains, by 1991 GM 
had three kinds of common stock: ordinary common, Class E 
common stock, and Class H common stock.126 Thus GM has multiple 
classes of common stock, one of which is a residual claim on the firm 
as a whole, the others being tied to the economic performance of 
divisions of the firm. The influential investment newsletter Value 
Line, in fact, treats GM as consisting of different firms, with the letter 
stock being the common stock of the firms-within-the-firm.127 
Under the shareholder value maximization norm, managers should 
maximize the value of which of these classes of stock? There is no 
reason to believe they can simultaneously maximize the value of each 
of them. Furthermore, picking one class of stock as the "true" com­
mon stock to be maximized would be merely arbitrary. Even if there 
were some reason for doing so in the case of GM, it is easy to imagine 
a case in which a firm had different classes of common stock tied to 
different divisions of the company and whose unlettered common 
stock represented only a trivial part of the firm's capitalization. When 
the bottom layer of the traditional capital structure is cut into pieces in 
this way, the shareholder value maximization norm tells managers 
nothing about what share values they should maximize. 
B. Resolving Equity Puzzles 
Option-like equity derivatives and letter stock are just two of the 
new products that Hu rightly suggests present difficult, and I would 
argue impossible, puzzles for traditional conceptions of fiduciary duty. 
Hu's paradoxes, however, are less difficult than they might seem, if 
one is willing to espouse the "neotraditional" reformulation of fiduci­
ary duty that I propose. 
1. Maximization Rights 
Hu correctly notes the impossibility of nonarbitrarily enforcing 
multiple "maximization rights" to several classes of equity holders, all 
126. See supra note 15. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101. 
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of whose claims cannot be maximized simultaneously. This problem is 
intractable as a matter of financial theory, since if equity shares are of 
different priority in their claims to firm value, their value will respond 
differently to the riskiness of the firm's underlying business. None of 
these classes of claimants will have efficient incentives across all mag­
nitudes of risk. Similarly, particular business decisions are bound to 
affect the value of the different lines of business of the firm differently. 
Shareholder value maximization provides no guidance to firms with 
letter stock if it cannot specify which shares the norm targets. Indeed, 
it is intuitively obvious that as financial innovation carves up the risk­
and-return stream that firms produce into ever more specialized 
pieces, a norm that calls for the maximization of the value of any one 
sort of piece at the expense of others will diverge increasingly from ef­
ficiency. The source of this problem should be faced squarely: the in­
sistence that the object of the duty be concrete holders of financial 
claims, rather than the abstract entity against which those claims are 
held. 
In the neotraditional approach I propose, the default norm for 
managers would be to maximize the value of the firm. Thus in a firm 
that had any number of horizontal slices of equity, the duty of manag­
ers would be to maximize the sum of the value of the various securities 
issued by the firm. If a firm had letter stock, managers would be duty 
bound to make the decisions that maximized the value of the firm. 
They would be violating the norm if they took decisions that increased 
the value of one class of letter stock by less than it decreased the value 
of another. Actual investors might well want to contract around these 
duties. An efficient corporate law would allow them to do so. But the 
efficient default rule to which hypothetical rational investors would 
agree is to maximize firm value. 
The neotraditional norm is very simple, yet it reduces the other­
wise daunting conundrums of equity derivatives to almost trivial pro­
portions. The more perverse the incentives of far-out-of-the-money 
option holders were in a firm with thinly sliced equity, the less weight 
they would have under the neotraditional norm. The misguided no­
tion that most residual claimants are specially situated to promote op­
timal managerial decisionmaking is simply abandoned, as it should be. 
Managers of firms with letter stock would equally know what to do. 
Common stock value would not be favored because it is more residual, 
nor would managers be forced to make Solomonic choices among 
claimants with equal and inconsistent claims. The managers would 
just try to maximize the value of the firm. If claimants wanted more 
than that, they would have to negotiate for it ex ante. 
2. Enforcing the Neotraditional Norm 
Because the content of the neotraditional norm is the maximiza-
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tion of firm value, all securities holders could be beneficiaries of it si­
multaneously. One might want to conceive of the rights that share­
holders, and perhaps others, would have under the neotraditional ap­
proach as being derivative in nature - that is, as belonging first to the 
corporate entity and second, and only indirectly, to the shareholders 
or other security holders. Because the right would be to have manag­
ers maximize firm value, at the level of the default rule, the rights of 
particular classes of security holders could not come into conflict. The 
maximization of firm value might have distributional consequences 
that particular classes of security holders might not like in particular 
cases, but this would be matter that they should resolve ex ante by ne­
gotiating provisions in the corporate contract. For example, bond­
holders could negotiate, as they sometimes do now, for covenants that 
protect them against the risk of leveraged transactions that decrease 
the value of bonds even if they increase the total value of the firm.128 
Throughout this Article, I have deliberately spoken in terms of a 
corporate law "norm." A norm is not necessarily a rule that one can 
enforce in court. Its authority more usually would take the form of a 
persuasive guide that only occasionally acquires legal force. Thus, the 
ability of shareholders to force firm managers to maximize share­
holder value is quite limited - the sale of the firm as in Revlon pres­
ents the clearest case. The business judgment rule permits much ra­
tionalization of managerial self-seeking.129 Nevertheless, the idea that 
it is for the shareholders that the managers ultimately manage firms, 
and that what they are trying to do for the shareholders is maximize 
the value of their shares, permeates both American corporate culture 
and the influential economically oriented academic discussions of cor­
porate law and policy. While shifting to a norm that makes more eco­
nomic sense might not make a sudden and predictable practical differ­
ence, it would still have a beneficial influence over time, especially in 
an era of rapid financial change. 
Implementing a new conception of fiduciary duty, especially one at 
variance with much corporate law doctrine, would present many prac­
tical problems that are beyond the scope of this Article, the purpose of 
which is merely to begin discussion. It is worth noting, however, that 
the neotraditional conception offers, at an idealized level, another ap-
128. See Richard G. Oemens, Poison Debt: The New Takeover Defense, 42 Bus. LAW. 
747, 750 {1987); Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 42, at 197-200; Kahan & Klausner, Anti­
takeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 50; Stark et al., supra note 84, at 566-68; Credit­
policy: Event Risk Covenant Rankings, STANDARD & POOR'S CREomVEEK, July 24, 1989, 
at 17; Daniel Hertzberg, "Poison-Put" Bonds Are Latest Weapon in Companies' Anti· 
Takeover Strategy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1986, at AS. 
129. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 
1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Carol Seidler, 
Comment, Assessing the Wisdom of the Business Judgment Rule in Corporate Control Con­
tests: Is It Time to Make Shareholders' Interests Paramount?, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 919 
{1990). 
. 
October 1999] Neotraditional Fiduciary Duty 265 
pealing feature, and one that helps motivate an entity-based approach. 
To explain this, let us return to the CAPM rational investor. If it were 
the case that all investors in truth held the market portfolio, then in a 
sense it would matter less what the content of the corporate law norm 
was. If the norm were to "maximize the value of residual claims," the 
CAPM rational investor would not press to enforce this norm, since 
doing so would not maximize the value of his diversified portfolio. So 
one might suppose that such a norm, though not finely tuned, would 
do little harm. It would seem better, however, if we could formulate a 
model that actually worked, at least at an idealized level, to push man­
agers toward the efficient managerial decision, if it were perfectly en­
forced. 
To that end, consider the following idealized enforcement sce­
nario. Imagine that security holders could costlessly monitor manage­
rial decisions, and that some enforcement agency, such as a court, 
could accurately determine when managerial decisions had departed 
from the norm. What norm, and enforced by whom, would have the 
effect of always correcting managerial departures from efficient deci­
sionmaking? The unique answer to this question is the neotraditional 
norm I propose, enforced by holders of all classes of securities. This 
norm works because its enforcement mechanism would produce an 
equilibrium at the efficient managerial decision. For example, imagine 
that managers decide to undertake a risky, but inefficient, project that 
will increase the value of residual claims but decrease the total value 
of the firm. If residual claimants are the only ones who can invoke the 
norm and enforce it, managers will proceed with their inefficient plan. 
But if nonresidual claimants could invoke and enforce the norm, they 
would prevent the inefficient project. But could these nonresidual 
claimants also prevent managers from undertaking some very risky 
but efficient project that decreased the value of their nonresidual 
claims but increased the value of residual claims by more? They could 
not, if the norm were not the maximization of the value of their par­
ticular claims, but the maximization of the sum of the value of all 
claims, that is, the maximization of firm value. This is why efficiency 
demands that the object of the duty be the corporation: no particular 
class of claims can efficiently have a maximization right, but all classes 
of claimants can have the right to demand that the value of the firm be 
maximized. It is easy to see that, if this were the case, whenever man­
agers undertook an inefficient project, some class of claimants would 
have the incentive to challenge it. Managers could defend actions that 
reduced the value of a class of claims only by showing that other 
classes gained more than the challenging class lost. Thus only actions 
that increased firm value would be immune from challenge from all 
classes of claimants. Maximization of firm value would thus be the 
equilibrium of the enforcement mechanism. If we then relax the as­
sumption that all investors are CAPM rational investors, this equilib-
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rium survives. Investors specializing in residual or nonresidual claims 
would have incentives to challenge inefficient projects, but invocation 
of the norm would not allow them to push managers to make ineffi­
cient decisions. 
C. Capital Market Imperfections 
Hu stresses the difficulties capital market imperfections, informa­
tion asymmetry, and the timing of firm cash flows can cause for con­
ceptions of fiduciary duty.130 These problems, however, do not seem 
any more insuperable for the neotraditional conception of fiduciary 
duty than for the traditional one. 
Financial research, it is true, has uncovered numerous apparent 
imperfections in capital markets.131 Whether markets are perfect or 
not, however, the relevant question is whether a better alternative for 
valuation of the firm exists. Under Hu's "blissful shareholder wealth 
maximization" duty, managers would be obliged to maximize the true 
value of shares, blissfully ignoring inaccurate valuation by the stock 
market. This approach implies a greater distrust in market valuation 
than in managers' ability to value future cash flows themselves and to 
rein in their natural human tendencies to self-service and optimism. If 
shares can be valued blissfully, however, so can firms. Market imper­
fections create no worse problems for valuing all of firm's financial 
claims than they do for merely valuing its stock. 
Of particular concern to Hu is the timing of cash flows. If markets 
cannot perfectly anticipate the timing of cash flows, and managers 
have information about the timing of flows superior to the market, 
then they will face decisions that in effect force them to choose among 
"generations" of shareholders. One investment might yield immediate 
benefits, while another might pay off only years hence - a payoff 
that, if we assume imperfect markets, might not reflect in the current 
price. If managers choose the investment with the later payoff, future 
shareholders will gain at the expense of present shareholders.132 Tim­
ing creates a conflict of fiduciary duty similar to that of having multi­
ple stock classes with conflicting maximization rights. 
Yet if we assume that managers really do have information better 
than the market's, the efficient result must be for managers to make 
the investment that the market has undervalued. In due course, the 
market will see its mistake, and share prices will rise to incorporate 
better information about the project's cash flow. The problem, it may 
130. See Hu, supra note 15; supra text accompanying notes 15-19. 
131. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND 
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE, ch. 12 (1992). 
132. See Hu, supra note 15, at 1300-05. 
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seem, is that this correction will come too late for earlier generations 
of shareholders, who will have already sold by this time. 
This problem, however, like Hu's other paradoxes, may be unrav­
eled with the help of hypothetical bargain theory using rational inves­
tors. Rational investors are widely diversified. If they are diversified 
across all firms, it seems likely they will be holding securities of firms 
whose projects are at all stages of their life cycles. They will own some 
stock in firms investing in projects that will not be correctly valued 
currently and some stock in firms whose stock is rising only now to 
correct previously mistaken valuations. Thus, rationally diversified 
investors should not choose a rule that would have firms do anything 
other than choose the value maximizing project, even if it did post­
pone the realization of gains. Diversified shareholders should expect 
to garner as many windfalls as they lose out on realizations of projects. 
If the fiduciary rule required intergenerational shareholder equity, 
however, this would reduce the total value of their portfolios. Their 
holdings in companies with early maturing but factually less valuable 
projects would not increase in value enough to make up for their 
losses in firms with late-maturing but, by hypothesis, more valuable 
projects. This leads to an interesting result. Rational investors in a 
hypothetical bargain setting would not choose a fiduciary rule that re­
quired some sort of equity across time. Rather, they would elect a rule 
that required managers to maximize firm value, even if this value were 
reflected in the price of securities only in the long run. (This only as­
sumes, as seems plausible, that in the large sample of firms in the mar­
ket portfolio, the maturity of projects would be normally distributed.) 
Once again, rational investors choose an efficient fiduciary rule, and 
paradoxes are avoided. 
D. Time and the Corporate Entity 
Finally, Hu argues that if directors owe a fiduciary duty to "the 
corporation," they may be obligated to avoid undertaking risky proj­
ects that might lead to the demise of the corporation, even if diversi­
fied shareholders would prefer that managers take these risks.133 This 
criticism, however, attacks only a straw man. A duty to the corpora­
tion could take several forms, and even a naively formulated duty 
would not necessarily require a duty to maximize the duration of a 
corporation's "life." In any event, the neotraditional formulation 
would require, as a gap filler, that the sum of the values of financial 
claims on the corporation be maximized. Managers conforming to this 
duty would adopt risky projects to the extent that their adoption 
would maximize the value of the firm, which might or might not be 
133. See Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 
38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 295-306 (1990). 
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consistent with maximizing the duration of the corporation's "life." In 
fact, critics of a duty running to the corporation should notice the 
beam in their own eye. It is not possible to formulate an efficient ver­
sion of corporate fiduciary duty in terms of only one class of financial 
claimants; it is necessary to invoke some proxy for the sum of the val­
ues of claims against the corporation, such as the concept of the corpo­
rate entity, to formulate an ideally efficient corporate fiduciary duty. 
The best argument that could be made for a duty running exclusively 
to shareholders would be that it is the best practical approximation of 
an ideally efficient duty, such as that proposed by the neotraditional 
formulation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The efficient norm for corporate law is simply: Maximize the value 
of the corporation, that is, the sum of the values of all the claims the 
corporation has issued on its value. This is just a default rule, around 
which one would expect much contracting, especially as contracting 
costs diminish over time. But it is the rule to which rationally diversi­
fied investors would agree ex ante, and a rule that can survive the dis­
aggregation of traditional equity that seems likely as financial markets 
continue to evolve. Until that time, to say the primary corporate norm 
is to "maximize shareholder value" perhaps will do, as long as we are 
sure not to mean exactly what we say. 
To shareholder value maximization, this Article offers an alterna­
tive - a duty to the corporation to maximize firm value. Firm value 
maximization is the efficient default rule. Hypothetical investors, 
modeled according to the most highly developed relevant theory of ra­
tional choice, would choose it. The proposed rule avoids problems 
that are theoretically clear now and will become increasingly pressing 
in practice. 
More compelling as a theoretical matter is the convergence of ra­
tional portfolio theory and a theory of an efficient version of the cor­
porate law norm. For reasons independent of corporate law norms, 
rational investors will hold a certain portfolio. This portfolio also 
gives these investors the correct incentives to maximize the value of 
the firm. The default rule chosen by investors of this sort will be the 
efficient default rule for filling gaps in the corporate contract. This 
bridge between the neotraditional corporate law norm and efficient 
portfolio theory strongly recommends my approach. 
